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ABSTRACT 
Understanding he rocesses of communication during 
mixed-moti e ar a1ni'ng in coalition depends to a great 
extent upon co , r h nsion of the ariables which affect it. 
Certainly one of th s important variables of such 
communication is he influence of personality effect upon 
the bar, aining u co s On , er onality variable, 
achiave,lllanis - i s r ngly related to manipulative 
behavior his thesis amines b,oth the effects of 
Machiavellianism on bargaining, ucce.:~ in face-to face 
triads, and explores th limit , of tho e eff c rel tive to 
task orientation and per on lity typ di c1o ure. 
It was found that achiav 11i~n ar m re able ba~ in r 
only so long as the nature and id ,ntity f h ir p ron 1i y 
type is not reveal~d to their o ponent . M hi v 111 n 
bargaining tactics, pow r, str gi , y1 
and a variety of factor r lat d b 
analyzed and a theory of order'n 
conflict resolution is di~ u 
h u1 
To Niccolo Machiavelli, 
I dedicate this Thesis 
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CHAPTER I 
THE EFFECTS OF MACHIAVELLIANISM ON BARGAINING 
SUCCESS IN TRIADS; A PILOT STUDY 
Introduction 
11 Machiavellianism 11 as a definition of behavior type, is 
derived from research which relies upon scales drawn from 
philosophical assertions espoused by Niccolo Machiavelli in 
1532; Mach scales (as they are known) measure the level of 
endorsement of manipulative attitudes with regard to interpersonal 
relationships. Self-perceived manipulative attitudes are in 
agreement with Machiavellian precepts concerning behavior; 
hence, high scorers (by definition those who do not take an 
overly social or moralistic view of themselves) behave markedly 
more manipulatively than low scorers in behavioral testing 
situations. In the past two decades several constructs in which 
individuals engage in social interactions which elicit 
interpersonal manipulations have been developed ... one, 
the triad, lends itself especially well to small group Mach 
studies. It is the purpose of this research study to further 
investigate the Machiavellian phenomenon in a triad situation 
in which subjects perpetrate manipulative attempts upon one 
another while engaging in a competitive activity specifically 
orientated to the examination and comprehension of the 
2 
persuasive/manipulative techniques of exploitation. 
- .. -
Generally stated, the main hypothesis of this pilot study 
posits a significant correlation between self-reports by a 
subject on the Mach IV and Mach V tests (Christie and Geis, 1970, 
1968 test editions) and degree of successful manipulations/ 
persuasions as reflected in point score during 11 COnfl i ct of 
interest 11 bargaining for coalition within a triad; influencing 
the distribution of point score so that "higher Machs 11 win 
significantly more frequently. Winni_ng per se is predicated 
upon manipulative and persuasive abilities, formation of 
coalitions, control of power durin~ play, and awareness of 
exploitative or propagandistic techniques. 
General Background and Supportive Research 
The triad, when designed as a three person bargaining 
coalition in competition, may be likened to the Roman 
Gladiatorial Triangle; exercises in forced alliances. These 
high conflict situations tend to produce a series of tenuous 
and constantly changing strategic maneuvers in which are 
manifested interpersonal manipulations initiated by each 
bargainer at another bargainer•s expense. Coalition 
research therefore has examined how persons .choose between 
alternative coalitions in situations where coalitions are 
necessary for persons to attain outcomes (see Gamison, 1964; 
Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973; for reviews). Cap 1 ow 1 s ( 195 9) 
expanded theory of coalitions in the triad, includes four 
four- criteria for comprehension of the motivational aspects of 
coalition: 
1. Members of a triad may differ in strength. A 
stronger member can control a weaker member and 
will seek to do so. 
2. Each member of the triad seeks a position of 
advantage with respect to each distribut i on of 
rewards. A larger share of reward is preferred 
to a smaller share; any share is preferred to 
no share. 
3. The strength of the coalition is equal to the 
strength of its two members. 
4. The formation of coalitions takes place in an 
existing triad, so there is a precoalitional 
condition in every triad. 
Anatol Rapoport (1960) discussing the viabi l ity of game 
3 
theory research remarked that an empirical approach to bargaining 
situations through study of coalition formation seem f ull of 
promise, asking whether a general (probabilistic) law can be 
observed (not derived) which would assign frequency 
distributions to all possible triplets? If indeed such a 
law were observed could we not derive from it a set of 
reasonable postulates which govern bargaining behavior? 
Taking this line of reasoning one step further, if different 
population samples show different distributions of rewards can 
these differences be attribut ed to different norms of bargaini ng 
behavior and manipulative skill? 
It is precisely this type of inquiry which prompt ed 
researchers in the Social Sciences to develop experimental 
designs integrating coalition game theory and sci en tific 
VI ii ii ]~ ~ 
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attitudes, lack of conventional morality, _ .19~-ideological 
commitments, and a generally cynical assessment of others -
have come to be known as high Machs. Past research which 
applies to the present study can be grouped according to two 
broad categories: persuasion and manipulation/exploitation 
where (high) Machiavellians exhibit some very different 
behaviors than (low) non-Machiavellians. Persuasion Mach 
5 
studies: Braginsky, 1966; Bogart, 1968; Geis, Levy and Weinheimer, 
1966; Harris, 1966; Jones, Gergen and Davis, 1962; Novielli, 
19 6 8 ; an d R i m , 19 6 6 . Man i p u l at i on I e xp 1 o i t at i on Mach stud i e s : 
Christie ~nd Geis, 1970; Exline, Gray and Schuette, 1965; 
Geis, 1964a, 1964b, 1968; Geis, Christie and Nelson, 1970; Geis, 
Weinheimer and Berger, 1966; Weinstein, Berkhouser, Blumstein 
and Stein, 1968. 
According to Burgoon, Heston and McCroskey (1974) "Not 
only is the high Machiavellian willing to manipulate others, 
he is more successful at it and enjoys it" (p. 33). In all of 
the previously cited experiments, high t~achs proved to be more 
effective than low Machs in exhibiting the communication skills 
necessary to control others. 
Situational criteria relevant to establishing conditions 
under which high and low Mach behavior most observably differs 
include: physical confrontation in face-to-face environment, 
latitude for improvisational interpretation of response, and 
available affective distraction. 
6 
Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) testing an ftqual power triad 
developed a three person situation in which serious manipulative 
attempts wet·e elicited from each player, who (in turn) attempted 
to resist being manipulated by the other players. They concluded 
that equal power weights resulted in equal division of rewards. 
Applying this conclusion to manipulation research, Geis (1964) 
successfully developed a sophisticated "Con Game, '1 the first 
triad Mach type research based on coalition game design. Her 
results reveal a positive correlation between high Mach scores 
and the successful manipulation of others. Rapoport (1960) 
describes a triad situation which was adapted by Christie and 
Geis (1970 Chapter IX) into the "Ten Dollar Game," a situation 
where three players split $10 between two partners, excluding 
the third. High Machs won excessively; the losers were not 
randomly distributed between the Middle and Low groups, but 
statistically were more apparent in the Low group. Conclusions 
drawn from this study suggest that 11 ••• winning vi a bargaining, 
appears to be directly related to Machiavellianism, and losing 
inversely related" (Christie and Geis, 1970, p. 166). 
Various independent research conclusions reveal no 
apparent differences between high and low Machs in 
standardized intelligence test scores (Singer, 1964, Wrightsman 
and Cook, 1965, Christie and Geis, 1970), birth rank (Newcomb, 
1963), or education level; sex, race, religion or any other 
demographic variable except perhaps age/population of area 
7 
where subjects spent most of their adolescence (Guterman, 1970). 
Hence, cosmopolitanism or urbanization may be a factor inversely 
relating 11 traditionalism 11 and Machiavellianism. 
If indeed the dissimilarities between individuals (other 
than Machiavellianism quotient) are insignificant, how then 
does one account for the disparity observed between bargaining 
success frequencies? . Conclusions concerning the '•reasons" 
behind high vs. low Mach game-playing deviations have been 
interpreted by Christie and Geis (1970, p. 209) as: 
Manifestations of low Mach distraction by ego-irivolving 
elements in the bargaining context ·, 11 or because high Machs are 
better strategists because they 11 ••• act by what they know 
makes them effective in exploiting whatever resources the 
situation provides (including low Machs) 11 (Christie and Geis, 
1970, p. 312). Is it knowledge or manipulation and persuasion 
or a proclivity for exploitation (or both) which helps to give 
high Machs an advantage over lower Machs who, it is theorized, 
are personally more distracted and perhaps less motivated or 
perceptive? 
Persuasion implies the intentional influencing of another 
person to an action, belief, etc., by appealing to his reason 
or emotion; while exploitation infers making 11 unethical 11 use of 
someone or something to one•s own advantage · ... both factors 
combined, form a semantic composite which yields a variable, 
albeit derogatory, definition of propagandizing. 
Though much propaganda type research has been conducted, 
conclusions which can be applied to Machiavellianism are 
8 
general and fragmentary. Examini_ng specific Mach investigations 
and inductively generalizing on subject propagandistic ability 
is more common, but difficult to substantiate. A notable 
characteristic of past research in this vein has been the attempt 
to disguise investigation of manipulative behavior or 
persuasive affect, by directing the subject's attention to some 
other plausible interpretation of experimental objectives. 
_Hence, utilization of a context where the subjects are informed 
that the experifl)ent not only deals ·with, but requires active 
participation in, persuasive manipulations (i.e. propagandistic 
orientation) has been limited. In addition to contextual 
disguises, most experimental methodologies refrain from 
giving subjects any specific advance base of common relevant 
information. Thus the subjects are not only obliged to 
accept a deceptive "smoke screen" experimental purpose, but 
also to enter into that construct uninformed. It is one thing 
to conclude that high Machs, by whatever exploitative/ 
pe r s u as i ve me an s at the i r d i s p o s a 1 , are a b 1 e to "w i n " 
(perhaps by default) over low Machs in an experimental 
situation which purports to be measuring something else 
and quite another to support that same conclusion in a 
situation where all subjects are not only informed as to the 
manipulative/persuasive nature of the experiment, but also 
have a common base of information, and are actively aware of 
and participating in propagandistic assessments with 
manipulative/persuasive interactions. It is precisely to 
investigate and further define the limits fo behavioral 
generalizations applied to the phenomenon of Machiavellianism 
vi s - a- vi s en h an c e d b a r g a i n i n g s u c ce s s rat i o s , t h at the '' The 
People Mover Game'1 (aka PMG) was devised. 
The research vehicle to be used in this study is a 
construct which includes all of the mandatory situational 
criteria to promote bargaining and operates in a setting 
which explicitly investigates the n·techniques of propaqanda. 11 
The PMG, whose experimental design is based upon game theory 
style small group interaction, is a bargaining-coalition 
triad constructed to remove any pretenses or 11 Smoke-screen'' 
issues from the persuasive nature of the experimental 
environment. Gallo, Funk and Levine (1969) analyzed experi-
mental environments which truly promoted reciprocity behavior 
and allocated responsibility for control, concluding that for 
an experimental vehicle to effectively fulfill their game 
theory mandate it must be 11 enhanced," "enriched" and provide 
a 11 decomposed matrix" of outcomes; the PMG meets all of these 
criteria. Lastly, from a bargaining coalition standpoint 
9 
conducive to Machiavellian behavior, the PMG is three-person 
(triad) small group, mixed-motive (where players have partially 
common/partially opposed interests), non-zero-sum situation 
10 
which provides face-to-face confrontation, latitude for 
distributive and integrative bargaining (improvisational elements), 
and attitudinal structuring for irrelevant affect (see Walton 
and McKersie, 1965). 
Research Veh i c 1 e; "The Game 11 
From G.H. Moulds' Thinking Straighter, Allen and Green 
(1966)developed The Propaganda Game as an "introduction 11 to 
propagandistic tecnhiques which distort the thinking process. 
This author modified The Propaganda Game into a bargaining 
coalition triad format suitable fo~ research manipulation. 
From The Propaganda Game's 240 examples sub-divided into 
fifty-five technique types; 60 examples were drawn, the 
technique types were condensed to twenty-one and categorized 
into nine distinct groups. These groups were arbitrarily 
assigned a reference number, 1-9, and a group containing 
11 no technique 11 was assigned number 10. Technique groupings: 
1. Prejudice/ridicule 
2. Abstraction-ambiguity-diversion 
3. Rationalization/pity 
4. Wishful thinking/oversimplification 
5. Flattery-status-manner 
6. Acceptable to the dubious/draw the line, moderatism/ 
radicalism 
7. Practical consequences/attacking a straw man 
8. Bandwagon/bargain 
9. Beginning or leading the question 
10. "No technique" 
(See Appendix A for rules, examples, definitions, etc., given 
each subject prior to participation in the People Mover Game). 
Severa 1 modi fi cations of the "rules •• governing p 1 ay in 
The Propaganda Game were necessary to assure that coalition 
bargaining would occur, but that no coalition would be any 
more likely, during play, than any other. Though some 
coalition alliance is mandatory for play to occur, specific 
strategy in the P_eople Mover Game 1s left to the discretion 
of each player. Scoring is weighted: to encourage 
bargaining, to balance for risk-taking, and enhance speed 
of play while penalizing hasty or impetuous judgment the 
11 Controller 11 function offers game flexibility, acting as 
11 
both a score/status enhancer and an impetus for non-Controllers 
to form "revolutionary" coalitions · against the "Group Leader 11 
(see Caplow, 1968; Michner and Lyons, 1972; and Lawler, 1975) 
Therefore, bargaining participation by any player in any 
coalition is based on at least one of three assumptions: 
I) Maximum advantage/minimum disadvantage of 
strength relative to coalition partner(s). 
II) Maximize strength of the coalitinn in relation 
to the excluded triad member. 
III) Avoidance (of either exclusion or inclusion 
depending upon specific strategic decisions 
made by any player). 
Statement of Pilot Study Hypotheses 
To summarize thus far, Machiavellianism generally should 
correlate with successful manipulation during conflict of 
interest bargaining coalitions with a triad, reflected in 
point score and win-loss ratios. By inference, supported by 
past research, successful bargaining is predicted upon 
12 
maDiP~lative and persuasive communication abilit ies, formation 
of coalitions, control of power, judgment or leadership, aware-
ness of exp l oi tati ve o ·~ propagandistic techniques and 
concentration on the conflict resolution or goal without 
becoming distracted by the processes which lead to that 
resolution. 
The above stated assumptions combined with evidence 
· supported by past reseach yielded severa.1 t es t abl e 
predictions: 
1. High Machs will win more points than low Machs , 
even though the game is structured for equal-
ization among all subjects. 
2. Use of the power position of 11 Controller 11 
will be more prevalent among high Machs , 
even though that position is equally 
available to all pl ayers. 
3. High Machs will participate in a greater 
number of stable coalitions. 
4. High Machs will make significantly more 
Plea Bargains, than either middle or low 
machs, because that variable is more readily 
manipulated, and will opt for any point 
score over none. 
(Post hoc analysis of pilot study data revealed a combination or 
interaction of predictions 2, 3, and 4 such that the balance 
of power position/play (i.e. controller/bold challenge, 
. 
coalition for majority, and plea bargaining) be more ab ly 
controlled to optimum advantage of a player in proport i on to 
the strength of his Machiavellianism Quot ient) . 
13 
Methodology 
The selection of subjects ·was accomplished by administration 
of the Mach IV test (7 point bipolar Likert-type scale; 20 X 
item mean + 20) and the Mach V test (forced choice, 20 question 
most/least weighted score + 20, 1968 edition) as contained 
in Christie and Geis (1970) (see Appendix B), to thirty-seven 
(37) subjects; fifteen (15) females and twenty-two (22) males, 
aged 19-56. After the scores were tabulated, it was obvious 
that initial intent to group subjects into high, middle and low 
groupings by quartile distribution (i.e. 40-70 = #1, 70-100 = 
#2, 100-130 = #3, 130-160 = #4) for each test, choosing 4/4 or 
4/3 as high; 1/1 or 1/2 as low; and the remainder as middle 
... would have yielded only two low Machs and one high Mach. 
This resulted in an immediate modification of the grouping 
procedure prior to conducting the experiment. The criteria 
used to establish Mach grouping was to accumulate the scores 
of both tests using 210 as the median, 30 points = Z (one 
standard deviation); hence: high Mach scores were greater 
than or equal to 240, low Machs were less than or equal to 
180, and middle Machs scored between 181-239. 
The selection of five triads with one high, one middle 
and one low Mach in each resulted in comparisons being drawn 
from 15 subjects, all subjects being randomly assigned to groups. 
Procedure 
All subjects were given full formal instructions in the 
form of a hand-out (see rules, Appendix A) and alloted 10-15 
minutes of individual study before engaging in a verbal recap 
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of game procedures, expectations, and purposes, to minimize 
subject disorientation and establish a common base of knowledge. 
All subjects were given the information that in order to score 
points some sort of coalition must be formed during each 
11 reading," however no subject was required to join one if 
he chose not to do so. 
Each reading constitvted a new condition subject to no 
restrictions from any previous coalitions, and that each 
participant was to accrue as many points as possible per 
reading; maximizing scoring to its full potential (i.e. winning) 
without regard to the other players. One trial reading was 
conducted to acquaint subjects with the "feel 11 of the game, 
after which any final questions were answered. 
The scoreboard was a three foot high X one foot wide 
vertical simple linear scale, from -5 to +21 inclusive. 
This scale was divided vertically into equal thirds, with each 
of the three subjects per triad having one column designated 
by his name written in at the 11 Zero" space. The order from 
left to right was alternated from game to game, so that no 
Mach group's subjects were assigned to a specific board 
.+. pOSlt.lOn. The subjects sat within arms length of one 
another facing each other and the control block (a standard 
15 
211 x 611 chalk board eraser) was centered among them. The 
- - -
experimenter read each selection chosen at random from the 60 
possible choices. If a re·.~eadi .ng · was requested, the request 
was granted. Readings continued and points accumulated 
until one (or more, if simultaneously) advanced across the +21 
mark to WIN, at which point the game was officially declared 
over. (None of the experimental runs exceeded 20 reading 
selections before sufficient points were accumulated to 
produce a winner). 
Results of the Pilot Study 
As shown in Table 1, by summing the individual scores 
together, a cumulative total score is derived which, when 
calculated against the expected value of 69.67 for each 
Mach group (i.e. 33.33% of the total, each group should 
receive one third of the points/rewards), a Chi-Square 
reveals significance in support of the main hypothesis 
beyond the .01 percent confidence level (x2 = 12.12 df 2 p<.Ol). 
Mach 
High 
Table 1 
PILOT STUDY; CHI-SQUARE COMPARISON OF BARGAINING 
SUCCESS AS A FUNCTION OF MACHIAVELLIANISM 
Group Sum Totals % Tot a 1 Fo-Fe 
91/209 43.54% 21.31 
(10.21%) 
Middle 68/209 32.53% -1.69 
(- . . 80%) 
Low 50/209 23.92% 19.69 
( "9 .. 41%) 
16 
In an attempt to further evaluate the relationship between 
the Mach test scores and successful point score in the PMG, a 
Pearson "r" was calculated for all subjects, yielding a 
correlation coefficient of .67 (hypothesis accepted beyond 
the .01 confidence level). This correlation compares 
favorably with the .71 correlation between subjects• scores 
on the Mach V and the Mach IV tests. Again using the 
technique of accumulating individual scores into high, middle 
and 1 ow Mach composite scores a Pears on "r 11 was ca 1 cul a ted 
between group Mach test sum totals and cumulative total 
points scored in 11 The Peop 1 e Mover Game" by each group . 
yielding correlation of .99 (significant beyond .05 confidence 
le ve 1). Strictly speaking, this correlation is based on a 
rather arbitrary scale; hence, .99, while perhaps indicating 
that by high, middle and low groups, 11 Mach-ness" and success 
17 
--
rate in 11 The Peop 1 e Mover Game" · go hand in hand - exactly how 
profound a revelation this relationship is, may be rather 
difficult to assess. 
Examination of the correlation ·coefficient calculated 
between the differences in Mach scores and point scores 
within each triad for all conditions yielded r = .57 significant 
beyond the .05 level of confidence in support of the main 
hypothesis. 
To further substantiate this correlation without using 
Pearson's product-moment principle, Kendall's Tau formula 
for use with tied ranks produced Tau= .61 (p<.Ol). The 
hypothesis that Mach score and game score would be related 
is clearly confirmed. 
Power Strategy 
As shown in Table 2, no Mach classification significantly 
opted for the Controller position more often than did any 
other classification. However, low Machs appeared to be more 
restrained - tending to seek the position slightly more often 
than either highs or lows. The actual results of how often 
the Controllers were correct is not particularly relevant, 
because only in the "Bold Challenge 11 mode would this be 
tested in the game situation. Analysis of correct responses 
reveals no indication that the efficacy ratio of initial 
responses was greater for one group than another (one way 
ANOVA yielded N.S.D. p<.20). There is an interesting 
Table 2 
PI LOT STUDY; . RAW SCORE GROUP COMPARISONS 
FOR GAME STRATEGY FREQUENCY 
Mach Group Controller Plea Bargain .coalition Made Accepted 
High 1.§.-3. 2/ garre 5 4 20-4/game 
37% 
Middle 18-3.6/ game 8 5 ~-4.4/game 
40% 
Low JQ-2/game 4 2 Jl-3.4/game 
23% 
Mach Group Bold Challenge Correct BC Incorrect BC 
High 8-1.6/game 7 1 
Middle 9-1.8/game 6 3 
Low 7-1.4/game 4 3 
18 
Mach Group Advance Sum Tot a 1 Ratio Penalty-Points 
High 113 95/105 86.6% -22 
Middle 104 68/105 64.7% -36 
Low 86 50/105 47 . 6~ -36 
19 
phenomenon, however, which suggests that the higher Machs 
may use the Controller position . to coax bargaining for 
coalition among the other players and then boldly challenge 
their majority to secure the optimum point count possible. 
This strategy occurred a total of four times (in three of five 
trials), once by a middle Mach and three times by high Machs. 
Insufficient data exists at this point in time to claim this 
strategy supports the second prediction; quite frankly, in 
retrospect, "The People Mover Game 11 is not constructed · in 
such a manner as to distinguish between points gained in 
power position (i.e.Controller) and points gained in power 
play (i.e. Plea Bargain or Bold Challenge). 
Examination of power play strategy reveals ~ contrary to 
what was expected in prediction #4, high Machs did not make 
more plea bargains, only more successful ones. Completing 
80% of those attempted, being refused only once in all 
trials, Table 2 shows that while the middle Mach group used 
Plea Bargain option most, they had less success than high 
Machs, completing slightly over 60% of their attempts. Low 
Machs made least use of the Plea Bargain, rejected as often as 
accepted. However, to a great extent low Machs were 
responsible for swaying their partners to accept the pleas 
made by the non-coalition member. In terms of persuasive 
ability, low Machs in this condition avoided carrying the 
plea to the Reader, promoting the acceptance of the bargain 
in 11 - o~ the 13 instances and successfully accomplishing this 
end in at least 8 successful bargains~ The unsuccessful 
Plea Bargains were rejected by pressure from high Machs 
in 4 of the 5 cases. Middle Mach rejection accounted for 
one unsuccessful low Mach attempted Plea Bargain, and low 
Mach rejection accounted for the one unsuccessful high Mach 
attempt. 
20 
It is interesting to note that of 17 Plea Bargain attempts, 
in all but one case, the 11 Correcti1 decision was made to accept 
or reject the Plea Bargain, not that accepted Plea Bargainers 
were more often correct, but rather, if the plea had been 
carried to the Readers, all players would suffer penalty 
points. These results suggest that the Plea Bargain condition 
.• 
is actually less readily manipulated than had been initially 
predicted. While anticipated Machiavellian bargaining 
success did occur, it is certainly as much a function of 
lower Mach intra-coalition persuasive amenabilities as it is 
of higher Mach persuasive manipulations. 
Perhaps the most revealing indicator of differences between 
Mach levels, are the results obtained from Bold Challenge 
tabulations, which provide an inpex representative of 
balances between risk, knowledge and willingness to manipulate. 
As was anticipated, there was a lack of significant difference 
between groups concerning use of the Bold Challenge, only 
slight motivational differences occurred as indicated by 
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frequency _of--use and this was manifested in the middle Mach 
group. Mach group efficacy ratios in regard to Bold Challenge 
reaffirms support of the hypothesis that ability rather than 
motivation is the key variable. 
A Chi-square was calculated to determine the likelihood 
of the departure of the observed distribution from its 
expected frequency, the resulting probability is beyond the 
.01 confidence level (X2 = 13.80 df = 2 p<.Ol). This power 
factor was responsible for clearly distributing the Machs 
into their predicted categories, not so much as a direct 
tool for point gain (though the better 11 manipulators 11 
applied it strategically) but as a double-edged sword, separating 
its wielders, based on ability, into distinct categories. 
Discussion 
Durkin (1967) posited that high and low Machs acquire 
knowledge ·of the world in two significantly different modes -
"an a 1 yt i c 11 and 11 an a 1 og. 11 This presumes that some cognitive 
dichotomy exists such that internalization of 11 new material" 
is programmed into an individual's field of reference as a 
combination of gut or emotional cognitions (i.e. analog) 
and/or intellectual or symbolic cogn i tions (i.e. analytic ) . 
Durkin further suggested that while the "same 11 communicati on 
may· be available to two individuals, the degree to which each 
individually perceives it, may be rather dependent upon his 
personal analytical or analogesque orientation. This 
relations~~p,_ accordi_ng to "encounter theory,'' is why during 
bargaining low Machs get · "_ego-distracted;" by "opening up" 
and relating to other persons, hence they actually get 
carried away by the other's influence. During bargaining 
high Machs send out their cognitions to communicate on a 
detached analytic level, never leaving the integrity of 
their cognitive framework. 
Tab 1 e 3 
PILOT STUDY; MACH GROUP EFFICIENCY SUMMARY 
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Mach Group Completed Answers # Correct # Incorrect 
High 87% 69 of 79 54 15 
Middle 95% 75 of 79 54 21 
Low 90% 71 of 79 52 19 
The encounter-theory may have some validity, but the pattern 
of responses in "The People Mover Game" shows a generally equal 
tendency for all subjects in this face-to-face communication 
situation to appear to one another as potential all ies , 
while perpetrating approximately the same number of manip ulative / 
persuasive attempts upon one another regardless of Mach leve l . 
How then does one account for the disparity in scores ? 
1) Table 3 reveals there to be no major differences 
tn- ·actua 1 percentage of 11 correct" responses. 
2) Efficacy ratios for each Mach category differed 
less than 12% between extremes (high to middle). 
3) Coalition frequency (Table 2) was only a minor 
factor slightly in favor of middle Machs -
which, by the way, was slightly contrary to 
expectation, but again this study was conducted 
with only a very limited sample). 
4) 11 Timing" was balanced by constructing the PMG 
in such a way as to virtually eliminate any 
contaminating effects carried along between 
or among players. Warm up runs were included 
to attempt to compensate for the possible 
novelty adjustment period before actual play. 
There is a slim possibility that some physio-
logical differences in recall time or reflex-
reaction time could exist between players, but 
the chance of that being a function of higher 
Machiavellianism Quotient seems rather unlikely. 
5) Education or background, was generally equated 
within each triad. All p1ayers received their 
instructions and base material prior to playing 
the game, and all had to identify their grade 
point averages to assure relative group homogenity. 
6) Sex or some other demographic independent variable 
cannot account for all the point score differences; 
however, there was a consensus among females tested 
that the Mach tests used were dated, sexist, and 
11 required" a woman to answer as if she were a man. 
This became an obvious problem early in the study, 
hence attempts to group triads with same-sexed 
individuals. 
Typical PMG play reveals the 11 disadvantaged" lowest are 
not, as one might expect, helpless, but rather are taken 
unaware. The next higher Mach, often the most active and 
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certainly one of the most powerful players, presses for 
advantage too impetuously, succumbing less to the inherent 
superiority of his opponents than to his own judgmental errors. 
By this sa~ _ token, the more successful and powerful high Mach 
players are aggressive but cautious, appealing to the 
'sensibilities• of their opponents while constantly (almost 
relentlessly) seeking the advantage. Without intending to 
sound melodramatic, high Machs almost "mesmerize" others 
into committing some concentration shift where inadvertent 
blundering, the factor between winning and not winning, 
decides the outcome of the game in favor of the highest Mach. 
The results of this pilot study clearly point to the 
importance of future research analysis to examine in greater 
detai 1 exactly how well 11 Machness" and manipulation/persuasion 
game skills correlate over a broader population, in attempt 
to further refine those factors responsible for high or low 
success ratios. Findings in the present study are not 
completely consistent with interpretations of the results 
gleaned in past research. The effects that have heretofore 
been attributed to "manipulative 11 high Machs, or "humanistic 11 
low Machs, may need reassessment. 
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Contrary to previous interpretations, based on observation 
of the interactions and interpersonal communication within the 
triads, it is reasonable to suggest that high Machs are aware 
of the personality and individuality of others. With a minimal 
amount of probing, the high Mach can accurately assess not 
only another•s "weakness, .. but instigate impromptu interacti ons 
to facilitate attainment of his specific goals. Lower Machs 
appear to ~e_ .. as aggressive, competitive and no more or less 
ingenuous, but while the high Mach strives in a goal oriented 
manner, the low Mach engages in the process of interaction, 
hence an apparent product vs. process dichotomy. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPANDING UPON THE PILOT STUDY 
It can be argued that virtually all communication is persuasion, 
however, for the purposes of this thesis it is sufficient to recognize 
tha t a substantial percentage of communication is specifically 
i ntended to persuade. As defined by Bettinghaus (1968) communica-
ti on devoted to persuasive intent is, " ... a conscious attempt by one 
individual or group of individuals to change the behavior of another 
ind ividual or group of individuals through the transmission of some 
message" (p.13). It was Tedeschi, Schlenker and Bonoma (1973) 
however, who pointed out the differen~e between persuasion and 
ma nipulation. Using their definition, manipulations are; 
11 Influence attempts in which the source tries to disguise or hide 
f rom the target the influence nature of the relationship" (p.234). 
This implies shrewd use of influence for one's own purposes or profit 
at another's expense without the other's knowledge of that use, a 
subtle but distinct differenc~ from. Bettinghaus' definition. 
Examining the bargaining proces·s from a classical game theory 
perspective Nash (1950) defines bargaining as; ''A non-zero-sum game 
that allows players to employ explicit communications and to make 
binding agreements ... over one or more issued in attempt to arrive 
at a jointly acceptable solution" (p. 129). Adding to this definition 
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an explanation of coalition behavior drawn from. Tedeschi etal.(1973) 
-. -
which" ... involves the formulation of groups whose intention is to 
use mutual . resources to accomplish some common · goal in . a mixed- motive 
situation 11 (p. 155); one arrives at a working definition for bargain-
ing-coalition. 
While no distinct solution to mixed-motive bargaining is 
apparent, there are certainly a myriad of resolutions. Thus, while 
"outcome 11 is relative to solution, hence often specifiable prior to 
the bargaining; the actual outcome of a particular resolution may 
take many forms. These forms can be classed into several identifi-
able ·methods or strategies which typify the "style" of bargaining 
used by different individuals. If an individual wishes to reach an 
agreement in which he receives a larger portion of the outcomes than 
his opponennts he must adopt a "competitive" strategy which increases 
his usable power, which in turn directly affects the opponents 
behavior resulting in a shift in outcome. A bargainer must implement 
his power cleverly or his opponent will mobilize counterpower, 
preventing the action from achieving its intended effect. How the 
fulcrum of this balance is shifted by virtue of one's Machiavellianism 
quotient, and more precisely, the limits of the effects of this 
variable relative to bargaining success is the purpose of this thesis. 
Coalition in Triads; The Bargaining Process 
Who enters into coalition and why? What determines who shall 
be excluded from the coalition? How will the outcomes be distributed 
among coalition members? What alternative coalition possibilities 
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are available to participants? Questions such as these have 
stimulated research on the processes, communication, decisions, and 
behavior involved in the formation and stability of groups whose 
intention is to use mutual resources, in a mixed motive situation, 
to achieve specific goals on outcomes. 
The importance of bargaining for coalition can easily be discerned 
simply be examin i ng historic texts and observing how often such unions 
mo t ivated the political, social and economic forces which sealed the 
fa t e of nations. As an area of specific interest to researchers in 
the social services, formal analysis of coalition was begun as early 
as t he · turn of the century (Simmel, 1902) but not until recently 
has major investigation into variable whi 0h affect coalition formation 
been undertaken. 
Caplow•s (1959) research, mentioned previously in the pilot study 
revealed three distinctly different conditions under which the 
processes of coalition were affected: 1) Continuous, where the 
coalition controls the activities/rewards of the participants across 
several situations or trials; 2) Episodic, where coalitions are 
fo rmed for the purpose of periodically controlling group outcomes 
over extended periods of time; and 3) Terminal, when the purpose 
of the coalition is to dissolve the group and redistribute power. 
These three conditions in turn are dependent on variables which roughly 
ca n be broken into two categories - A) those which impact on mat erial 
resources or capabilities of the participants, and B) those wh ic h 
ar ise from interpersonal factors and interactions which affec t t he 
distribution of rewards of outcomes. Category A) type var i abl es 
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are of major concern to researchers whose work focuses on the 
structural and/or material aspects of coalition. Category B) 
variables, on the other hand, are of import to researchers investi-
gating status, norms of "fair play", persuasibility, and manipula-
t i on as personality factors which influence coalition formation. 
Ca tegory A) research includes the work of: Shapley (1953) in 
va l ue theory; Caplow (1956, 1959) initial distribution of power 
and logical allocation of rewards; Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) game 
theory interpretation of coalition frequency; Harsanyi (1963) 
who extended Shapley's model to determine the allocation of rewards 
wi t hin · a single bargaining game; Gameson (1964) pivotal power, 
inversion effect of minimum power concept, and the minimal resource 
theory; Adams (1963) parity norms and equity principles; Chertkoff 
(1966, 1971) development of minimum resource theory; Vinacke, 
Crowell, Dien and Young (1966) information as a resource; Caldwell 
(1972) amoutn of individual resource vs. desire to join coalition; 
Komorita and Chertkoff (1973) alternative coalitions; and Lawler 
(1975) radical coalitions. 
Category B) research includes: Vinacke and a multitude of 
associates (e.g. Amidjaja and Vinacke, 1965; Bond and Vinacke, 1961; 
Uesugi and Vinacke, 1963; Vinacke, 1959, 1962) investigation of 
exp loitative and accommodative orientations to maximization of outcomes , 
mal e vs. female strategies during bargaining, and attraction effect ; 
Kel ly and Arrowood (1960) focus, confusion and affection relati ve to 
random coalition formation; Gamson (1964) confusion and distract i on 
theory; Anderson (1967) status differences and the impact of 
evaluation or esteem upon coalition formation; Ofshe and Ofshe 
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(1969, 1970a, 1970b) reciprocation, choice and the stable state 
t heory; Cherkoff (1971) information and manipulation; and Tedeschi, 
Schlenker and Sonoma (1973) subjective expected utility theory of 
coalition. 
Most of the theories and experimental findings listed above 
have been drawn from situations wherein any coalition which forms 
automatically wins. This fact alone casts doubt on any broad 
generalization from experimental environment to real life situations 
beca us~ seldom is it certain that merely forming a coalition 
gua rantees success in bargaining. Rather, a coalition only 
nhances the probability of grea~er success for its memebers viewd 
as a group. Since each individual participant in mixed-motive 
bargaining has his own outcome at stake, often what might be advanta-
geous to the majority of the members in coalition may actually be 
less beneficial to a specific individual. Hence each participant 
examines the expected values of all coalitional possibilities avail-
able to him. He then balances this against his lone potential out-
come and then determines what he can expect as the maximum outcome 
and attempt to implement it; herein lies the crux of bargaining 
strategy. 
In demand-for-consensus situations such as the experimental 
env ironment in this study, to effectively negotiate a bargain means 
to pursue the dual, usually contradictory goals of m~ximizing one's 
own payoff and reaching some kind of group agreement in coalition. 
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Therefore, the situation itself must be viewed as a process through 
which · various individual interests are gradually transformed into an 
acceptable coaliton. 
Lack of broad integrating theories and penchant to concentrate 
upon single processes (e.g. counter attitudinal advocacy, cognitive 
di ssonance, etc.) deter communication researchers within the social 
sciences from developing universal (or for that matter, even shared) 
def initions. Reviewing the existing volume of methodological 
experimental research into the communication of cooperation and 
conflict, one notes that the number of studies examining personality 
vari ab1es are quite obviously in the minority. Though there are 
certainly many explanations for this facti two of the most prominent 
~tern from a) ·beJief that personality effects are too ephemeral, 
/ 
affecting communication and behavior in some situations, but not 
others, and b) that testing hypotheses about particular personality 
types requires extensive personality pretest administration to large 
groups of subject, from whose ranks emerge a select few of those 
i nd ividuals possessing those qualities which exemplify the relevant 
personality variable. I submit that these, and all other rationale 
for avoiding further investigation into the study of personality 
ffects are insufficient; and further, contend that if we are to 
adequately comprehend - much less, develop a comprehensive theory of -
communication during bargaining relative to cooperation/conflict 
behavior, personality variables must be included. Communication 
res earch which generalizes from the experimental environment t o 
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broader public domains always includes sufficient variance among 
i ndividuals to infer that significant influence derived solely from 
differences in person~lity is expected upon the outcomes. Granted 
the outcomes or stakes in 11 real life 11 interactions are functions of 
t he value systems and motives of the participants, andthe complexity 
of the 11 games 11 . being played vary with cognitive styles of the players. 
A major characteristic of situations. which attempt to resolve 
conflict that makes them especia11y vulnerable to the idiosyncracies 
of personality variables, is the fact that intentions underlying 
particular actions are seldom obvious. Hence, an ostensibly 
cooperative communication may either be genuine or rather an attempt 
t o l ure another person into a position more susceptible to manipulation. 
Conversely, the uncooperative communication m~y also be either 
aggressive or defensive in intent~ Coupling these factors with 
t he cogniti ve styles of the indivudals it is possible, for example, 
to have three persons in conflict: one disposed toward cognitive 
simplicity who perceives the possible stakes only as victory or 
defeat and all other individuals as opponents to be beaten; the 
econd person may be cognitively complex, seeing the other players 
not so much as opponents. but as potentia 1 partners to be won over: 
f inally the third participant, a cognitively multiplEx individual 
erceives a range of outcomes in which through some compromise an 
optimal solution is possible. Given such ambiguities, interpreta-
tion of one individual's actions by another is, to some major ex t ent, 
a fu nction of the latter's predispositions and personality vari ab les -
among them Machiavellianism. 
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Yet, it is naive to assume that the utility functions reflected by 
point score are representative indices of the motivations in which 
are manifested the subject's personality. lienee, one indivi ,jual 
(high Mach) may experience maximum utility and satisfaction by "out-
witting" his opponents, while another (low Mach) may experience 
maximum utility and satisfaction when he perceives during interaction 
t hat his opponents are contented by achieving a slightly inequitable 
di stribution of rewards, the cost of which is unimportant, as the 
"real" issue is the complexity of the interaction. 
Va riables 
Once the conditions. of the construct have been outlined, there 
ar i ses the task of manipulating elements inherent within these 
parameters to test the limits of Machiavellian influence. 
/ 
Burgoon 
et al. (1974) suggests; "If in a group, you are attempting to 
mi nimize the influence of a high Mach, one of the few things you 
can do is de-emphasize the task ... '' ( p. 44). Hemphill (1961) 
investigating verbal reinforcement, concluded that experimenter 
pos itive reinforcment and emphasis on subject participation 
significantly increased the frequency of those subjects to attempt 
leadership in the group. The suggests that perhaps the "irrelevant 
affect" which emotionally distracts i. ow Machs may be behaviorally 
modified by simple reinforcement of, and additional emphasis on, 
participatory leadership-information-concentration behavior. 
From a bargaining perspective Tedeschi et al. (1973) suggests 
promotion of the power inversion effect, where, predicated on the 
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knowledge that bargaining strengths may differ between players, 
weaker group members form coalitions against stronger group members. 
~ T h is is similar to Lawler's *1975) study of factors affecting the 
mob ilization of 'revolutionary' coaliti'ons .. This promotes coalitions 
aga inst the 11 Stronger" high Mach, by the less strong low Machs -
causing the stronger player to lose more and the weaker players to 
wi n more control; hence, weakness is strength. 
Machiavellianism generally correlates with successful mani pula ti on 
duri ng mixed-motive conflict of interest bargaining coalitions wi t hin 
a t r iad, reflected in outcome ratios. By inference, supported by 
past re~earch, successful bargaining is predicated upon manipulative 
nd persuasive communication abilities, formation of coal i t ions, 
-ont rol of power, judgment and/or leadership, awareness of exploi t a-
ti ve or propagandist i c . techniques and co·ncentra ti on on the conflict 
resolution or goal without becoming distracted by the processes 
whi ch lead to that resolution. In this thesis, two additional 
va r i ables are to be introduced: 1) emphasis on the need for all 
laye.rs to. concentrate on the task at hand, and partial disclosure 
of t he nature of Machiavellianism; as well as 2) full disclosure 
of t he general characteristics of the Machiavellian personality 
including the actual Machiavellianism Quotient of each subj ect in 
. 
the bargaining triad, to all triad members. 
Statement of Hypothesis 
Main: High Machs are more successful than low Machs i n mixed-
motive bargaining coalition situations. Much of this success will 
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be attributed to th~ir superior manipulative abilities, lack of 
emphasis on conventional ethical standards, and a detached approach 
to interpersonal functioning. Until such time as Machiavellianism 
Quotient disclosure reveals his true nature, a participant will 
control the balance of bargaining power, both in l eadership and 
j udgment, to his advantage in proportion to his Machiavellianism 
Quotient. Disclosure of the Nature of Machiavel lianism's emphas i s 
on task orientation, and particularly the impact of revealing each 
i ndividual's Machiavellianism Quotient to all members of the 
bargaining triad will negate any innate or acquired super ior 
manipulative skill possessed by a member· Machiavel lian. 
This thesis posits that the effects of Machiavelliani sm on 
bargaining success in mixed-motive coalition triads will be limited 
by 1) personally labeling Machiavellian individual s as manipulators 
t o the other triad members, and to a lesser extent 2) by stress ing 
t he need for all participants to concentrate on t he bargaining task 
wi thout considerati·on for the outcomes of any other player. 
Testable Research Predictions 
#1) In the base condition (i.e. condition .1) high Machs will 
successfully out bargain lower Machs and receive a s i gnificant 
and disproportionally large share of the outcomes, whi ch will 
result in high Machs winning more games. 
#2) When all subjects are specifically instructed to concentrate 
on optimizing the bargaining task to overcome t he inf luence of 
a skilled Machiavellian manipulator in their midst; high Machs 
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will win somewhat more points than low Machs, but the margin . of 
---
difference will not be as profound as in research prediction #1. 
#3) Full disclosure of the nature of Machiavellianism, coupled with 
revelation of the Machiavellianism Quotient of each participant, 
should effectively equalize and limit any effects on bargaining 
due to Machiavellianism .. Hence, no statistically significant 
score disparity among participants will occur. 
#4) The balance of power strategies (i.e. bold challenge and coali tion 
for majority) will be mo.re ably controlled to optimum advan tage 
of a player in proportion to the strength of his Machiavel lianism 
Quotient only so long as that Mach Quotient is not known t o his 
opponents. 
Operationalization 
Condition 1. Eight triads (n=24) 
Establishment of basic homogeneous bargaining-coalition triads 
consisting of one each high, middle and low Mach males; where 
each individual's purpose is to accrue the maximal point score 
per reading, with the goal being a "win" of 20 total points . 
· The gains are accomplished by establishing the identity (by 
type #) of various manipulative-persu~sive techniques of 
propaganda. Subjects score either by, majority consensus or 
via an individual direct challenge of the "correctness" of a 
majority•s decision. Subjects will be provided with a common 
base of specific information regarding point score and classifi-
cation of propagandistic techniques. All subjects wil l be 
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informed prior to the actual participation that the rules of 
the game are designed to promote and encourage individual 
development of strategic tactics. 
Condition 2. Eight triads (n=24) 
Bargaining groups are as identical as possible to those composed 
in Condition 1.; with additional emphasis placed on the 
necessity for each individual to apply himself to the barga i ning 
task, accumulating as many points as possible for himsel f wi t hou t 
regard for any other player's outcomes. Plus a pregame 
explanation about manipulation, Machiavellianism, and r evel ation 
of the fact that one such Machiavel is a member of each bargaining 
triad. 
Condition 3. Eight triads (n=24) 
Identical in composition to Conditions 1. and 2. with the 
inclusion of additional pregame information promoting poss i bl e 
inversion effects. This explanation will emphasize t he 
importance of each individual's concentration on the task, the 
nature of Machiavellianism, and the group identification of each 
participant's Machiavellianism Quotient. 
CHAPTER III 
STRUCTURE, PURPOSE -AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Game Theory and Communication. 
In any bargaining in coalition game situation, one participant 
or group seeks to gain compliance from another participant or group. 
In such situations lines of communication and behavior are established 
i n an attempt ·to get another to comply in a manner advantageous to the 
manipulator, even though the target individual is apt to respond 
unpredictably. The perpetrator of manipulation, if he is to 
accomplish hi-s ends, must then counteract the moves of those from 
whom he seeks compliance by a variety of direct or subtle deflecting 
maneuvers. It is precisely these maneuvers which, when observed in 
con tinuum, reveal a manipulator's strategic and exploitative skills. 
The problems of communication, trust, s.uspicion and temptation 
which accompany mixed-motive bargaining provide a wealth of 
opportunity for the imaginative manipulator to exercise various aspects 
of his strategy. It follows that winning strategies are successful 
attempts to implement an agreement which convinces the other 
part icipant(s) that the best manipulator should receive a greater 
port ion of the total outcomes than they. To do this, a bargainer 
must implement any power he possesses, or he can attempt to dis tor t 
his partner's and opponent's perception of the actual nature of the 
power relationship. 
38 
39 
Generally, the mixed-motive bargaining situation utilized as 
t he experimental environment of this study begins conflict with one 
participant attempting to establi.sh a controlling structure within 
t he triad from whi.ch compliance to his . intentions is. a 11 normal'' or 
"l egitimate 11 consequence. His control may be countermanded by 
several contradictory course of action introduced by either one 
or both of his potential controllee, or the latter may accept the 
overall structure as suggested by the controller and erstwhile 
mani pulator, but redefine some specific elements of the bargain 
pr ior to coalition, this modifying the outcomes in his behalf; 
i n essence perpetrating a countermanipulation upon the individual 
in control. In response to this counteroffer the controller must 
either insist on his original course of action, attempt to direct 
the impetus of his bargaining to only one of the two .potential 
m ni pulatees establishing a dyadic union which also elicits maximum 
payoffs for himself, utilize elements of his opponent's presentation 
or t hie own exploitative value, challenge via threat of punishment 
ny other coalition or course of action suggested by his opponents 
hi ch would reduce his own outcomes below his minimum acceptable 
limit , or succumb to the will of a superior manipulator and accept 
ny form of counter proposal lest he be excluded from the coalition 
. 
ntirely, thus receiving no outcome at all. 
Usualiy the structure of communication during bargaining is 
constructed in phases. The first offer is introduced and immediatel y 
i s accepted or thwarted; the offer is either re-introduced,. modified 
or withdrawn; any new offer introduced is either accepted or thwarted 
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and so on. Each game consists of numerous rounds and each round in 
turn may be composed of several offers and counter offers. The round 
ends when:. the controller succeeds in keeping his power; when the 
intended manipulatee has avoided or evaded the controller•s frame 
of compliance, opting for some other course of co-alition action; 
when there is a. standoff; when any participant demands a bold 
challenge breaking off any further bargaining; or when al l members 
of the triad accept unanimous plea bargain accepting the minimum 
positive outcome over none or negative outcomes.. The game ends 
when the most skilled manipulator(s) has triumphed over hi s 
adversaries successfully achieving the required point score terminating 
additional rounds. 
Speaking in ~road terms, participants identify t he "pur pose" of 
the game in play, although not usually i~ terms of specific strategies 
by establishing communication among one another in order to become 
cognizant of the individual goals each has chosen. This is, presumably, 
what is meant by game theory rationale. Awareness that the other 
participants have individual goals, as evidenced by their respective 
l i nes of action and the varied but finite means available through which 
t o realize them, defines the preliminary parameters necessary for 
bargaining interaction. In a sense the mandatory nature of this 
understanding is a meta-communication in and of itself by virtue of 
fact that absence of same constitutes the principal condi t ion under 
whi ch bargaining cannot proceed. Hence, once participant s have 
defined the structure of the barqaininq situation, they beg in to 
i nterpret the symmetrical or complementary understandings which tacitly 
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establish the motivation for coalition, negotiation and strategic 
-~ - -
manipulation - all .of which are based upon the crucial aspect of 
mutural agreement. 
One area in which the present study differs from the more 
mathematical models of game behavior is the shift of emphasis from 
perfect (zero s~m) information to a condition of intentionally 
ambiguous and imperfect information (mixed-motive) wherein the 
players have i.n genera 1, partially-common/partially-opposed 
i nterests. It is exactly this imperfect information feature which 
should enhance generalizability from the findings of this study to 
the imperfect information conditions which characterize bargaining 
i n real life social situation. Rather than constrict ingenuity, 
i ndependent action, or novel communication strategies, this game 
esign provides the participants with a stressful environment which 
eli cits anxious concern over numerous face-to-face stratigic 
decisions and adds incentive for individuals so inclined to directly 
an tral the situations - so long as some form of coalition exists 
between or among the players contro1led. Exercising this game 
f r amework within conditions which differ in regard to task orienta t -
t ion and personality variable disclosure should provide a rough 
"yardstick 11 to measure the limits of the effects of the Machieavellian 
per sonality upon bargaining success in triads. 
There are those critics of bargaining and associated game 
frameworks who object to manipulation/persuasion studies of t hi s 
type because Machiavellianism Quotient, achievment orientation, 
dominance, etc., pre-suppose participants to be to some greater or 
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lesser degree, basically immoral and essentially opportunistic. 
In response, I contend, that it is not that bargaining pre-supposes 
any particular morality; rather, in the mode of game framework, 
bargaining indicates that personality variable both affect and effect 
bargaining outcomes and such enhanced skill has advantageous rewards. 
Amoral and adept manipulators are simply one of a variety of traits 
manifested within several personality types, which for some are seen 
as ne'er-do-wells, for others, role models. This study proposes 
t o assist humanistic communication researchers in their unders tandi ng 
of those elements which mig·ht assist moral man in immoral society, 
and for those opportunists less concerned with the fate of manki nd, 
vi ce versa. 
Met hodology 
Subject selection was accomplsiehd by administration of the Mach IV 
t est (7 point Likert-type scale; cumulative +20, Christie and Gei s 
1970, p. 17; see Appendix B) to five hundred and sixty two (562 ) 
ma le subjects. · All tests were scored and compared to discern i f 
any significant homogeneity differences were obvious relative to Mach 
type concentrations among the different subject population pools 
t ested. Analysis ·yielded no significant differences in the 
distribution of high, or low Machs across the four major populations 
tested (i.e. TU and USF college students at random, Naval Tra ining 
Center recruits, Kappa Alpha Fraternity members, and sworn personnel 
of t he Orange County Sheriff's Department.) Low Machs, t hose 
i ndividuals sco~in~_between 40 and 80, numbered· 11%, thus accounting 
for 28.67% of the total population. Mach V tests (forced choice, 
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20 question most/least, weighted score +20 (Christie and Geis, 197~ 
--
p. 2?-32, see Appendix B) were then administered to a randomly 
selected total of sixty-three )63) of those subjects living in 
Orange County who had completed the Mach IV test. Low Machs were 
considered to be those individuals whose scores fell below 80, 
while a high Mach was indicated by any score equal to or greater 
than 110. Each subject•s score on Mach V was compared to his 
score on Mach IV; if a subject•s score did not correlate suffi ciently 
between tests such that when both scores were averaged the total no 
l onger fell within the range for his Mach classification that 
subject was withdrawn from the population pool. Forty-six (46) 
of the sixty-three (63) subjects tested were selected for the 
additional testing on the basis of their high or low score on the 
Mach IV test. Of these forty-six subjec'ts, four (4) were discarded 
due to lack of score correlation, yielding two Mach pools of twenty-
one (21) each high and low Machs. The remaining seventeen (17) 
subjects were chosen at random from a population pool consisting of 
midrange Mach IV scorers who were available for further testing and 
1nt erested in participating in one or more of the experimental 
conditions. One of these individuals was not considered for study 
ue to lack of correlation between Mach test scores. 
From the fifty-eight (58) males in the final population pool , 
thi rty-six (36) subjects were actually used. Six (6) triads consist-
ing of one each high, middle and low Mach were drawn randomly from 
the pool and then two (2) triads were placed into one of each of the 
three experimental conditions. This proved to be an extremely 
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time-consuming unconservative means of instituting the experimental 
manipulations. Therefore a more economical and efficient method of 
triad construction was devised. Utilizing rotation, this method 
placed each subject in all three experimental conditions while 
assuring that no subject was ever placed in a triad which contained 
another subject with whom he had interacted in any previous 
experimental condition. This method of rotation not only 
conserved subjects, lessened the load of coordinating times and 
personal schedules, but also reduced confusion as to how the game 
was played, thus eliminating the need for rule reading, warm-up 
rounds; etc. after the initial experimental condition. (For a 
diagram of the rotation system used see Appendix A.). This alloe-
ed the formation of eighteen (18) triads, made up of eighteen (18) 
subjects in two nine (9) subject units, / supplying six (6) triads 
per experimental condition. These eighteen (18) triads when com-
bi ned with the six (6) early triads, yielded eight (8) triads in 
each experimental condition. (Twenty-two (22) of the subjects 
fully tested were not selected to participate in any experimental 
condition.) 
Procedure 
As in the pilot study all subjects were given a printed 
instructional handout (see Appendix A) and allotted individual study 
ti me prior to engaging in a verbal recap of the game and bargai ning 
procedures. The importance of coalition formations was explai ned 
and the open ended nature of coalition for majority and plea bar-
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gaining was discussed. Each participant was briefed on the score 
tabulation process and an effort was made to familiarize all 
participants with the request for reread and bold challenge 
procedures. 
The scoreboard was either a chalk board or newsprint pad, upon 
which was lined a vertical simple linear scale, from -5 to +20 
inclusive. (This aspect differs slightly from the procedure in 
the pilot study in that the scale is one space shorter, hence 
winning occurs at 20 as opposed to 21.) The scale is divided 
into equal thirds vertically with each subject•s name written in 
at the zero space, in alphabetical order from left to right. The 
subjects sat within arm 1 s length of the designated control block 
(either a standard chalk board eraser, or a 211 x 211 x 6" piece of 
white pine) centered among them. 
After all subjects in a triad said they understood what was 
to be expected during play, the experimenter ran a trial reading 
(this step was deleted if all subjects within a triad had played 
the game before) after which any final questions a subject had were 
answered. In Condition 1. the ·experimenter closed the pregame 
discussion by emphasizing to all participants that each reading 
constituted a new condition subject to no restrictions from any 
previous coalitions, and that each particpant was to accrue as 
many points as possible per reading, maximizing scoring t o hi s 
fullest potential. 
Condition 2. The experimenter restated all the information given 
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in the first condition, additionally stressing the need for each 
player to focus his attentions on winning and applying himself to 
efficiently complete the bargaining task. The experimenter 
emphasized that all players should accumulate as many points as 
possible without regard for the outcomes of any other player. At 
this point the experimenter then said, 11 0bviously the tests which 
each of you took recently have some bearing upon this experimental 
game. Perhaps I should shed some more light on the issue to 
clear up a little of the confusion. First, the study of commun i -
cation overlaps into most other areas of the social sciences, li ke 
psychology. One area of parallel interdisciplinary research 
concerns itself with how different personality variables relate to 
communication and behavior of persuasive or manipulative intent. 
Each of you in this group, based so l ely on these tests, has been 
c 1 as sed as either a high, middle or 1 ow Mach. 11 ~1ach-ness 11 as 
derived from the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, an Italian 
statesman, is the extent to which one advocates manipulating 
situations and people to one•s own ends. Now without going into 
a long or moralistic diatribe on how the Machiavellian personality 
manifests itself, suffice to say that one of you in this group is 
a high Mach and should exhibit some very Machiavellian tendenc ies 
while the one who is a low Mach probably will not. Now that's all 
I 'm allowed to say at this point in time, if you are interested in 
additional information, call me at work in May or June. 
begin 11 • 
Now let's 
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The experimenter's pregame discussion in Condition 3. included 
I 
all of the material contained in Condition 2, but excluded any 
additional emphasis placed on task orientation. In addition to 
the dialogue disclosure concerning the Machiavellian personality, 
the experimenter included 11 •• suffice to say that in bargaining 
situations wuch as this higher Machs do significantly better jobs 
of achievi·ng their goals at the expense of lower Machs. In this 
group, (subject's name) is the highest Mach, and (subject ' s n.ame) 
is the lowest Mach. If you are interested in . additional i nforma-
tion, call me at work in May or June. Now let us beg i n, and may 
the best .Mach win. 11 
From the main choice bank of 60 technique cards of t en types, 
twenty cards, two of each type were drawn at random for Co nditi on . 1, 
of those cards remaining every other one /went into a stack des i gn-
ated for Condition 2, the remainder being reserved for Condition . 3. 
There was also a secondary choice of 20 additional technique cards 
f rom which readings were drawn whenever any game played exceeded 
twenty readings. . In each condition the experimenter read technique 
cards selected at random from the card bank for that condi t ion. If 
any subject requested a re-reading, the request was granted. · 
Readings continued and particpants bargained, challenged, and 
entered into~coalition accumulating points until one i ndi vidual or 
coalition advanced across the +20 line to win, at whic h poi nt the 
experimenter officially declared the game over and all subjects 
were then released or rescheduled for additional bargai ning situations. 
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Of the thirty-six (36) subjects who arranged to participate in the 
experiment only one was unable to attend a scheduled session 
fortunately one of the middle Machs from one of the "single play" 
triads was available to fill in. Hence six High Mach subjects 
played one game each and six played three games each; five middle 
Mach subjects played one game each, five played three games each, 
and two played two games each; six low Machs played one game each 
and six played three games each. The average number of readings 
necessary to establish a winning participant in Condition .1, was 
eighteen (18); in Condition .2, sixteen (16) readings, and in 
Condition .3, twenty-two (22) readings were necessary. (Much of 
the increase in average number of readings in Condition .3 can be 
attributed to the one triad in which thirty-eight (38) readings 
were required to complete the game.). 
Results 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Individual total point scores in each Mach grouping for all 
three experimental conditions are listed in Table 4. 
Tab 1 e 4 
RAW TOTAL POINTS SCORED BY EACH SUBJECT 
High Mach Middle Mach Low Mach 
Condition .1: 18 20 12 
16 / 20 16 
20 8 6 
20 12 20 
20 18 9 
20 20 4 
18 15 20 
20 14 11 
152 127 98 
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High Mach Middle Mach Low Mach 
Condition .2: 20 12 20 
20 20 10 
20 18 8 
20 15 11 
15 14 20 
20 20 14 
20 16 14 
20 20 20 
155 135 117 
Condition .3: 15 20 20 
20 l 4 11 
20 20 20 
18 18 20 
12 20 14 
19 20 18 
20 9 20 
11 20 16 
135 141 139 
The raw score data from Table 4 were submitted to a One -Way 
Analysis of Variance, the results of which are di sp l ayed i n 
Table 5. 
Tab 1 e 5 
ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF BARGAINING SUCCESS 
AS A FUNCTION OF MACHIAVELLIANISM. 
Experimental 
Condition 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Source of 
Variation 
Between 
Samples 
Within 
Samples 
Total 
Variation 
Between 
Samples 
~~i thin 
Samples 
Total 
Variation 
Between 
Samples 
Within 
Samples 
Total 
Variation 
ss 
182.58 
406.37 
588.96 
90.34 
254.62 
344.96 
2.34 
294.62 
296.96 
df MS F 
2 91.30 
4.72 
21 19.35 
23 
2 45.17 
3.73 
21 -' 12.12 
23 
2 1.17 
.083 
21 14.03 
23 
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p 
<.02 
<. 04 
>.92 
The overall treatment effect was significant in support of the 
main hypothesis (F 2,69 = 7.57 p <.001). The data in Tabl e 5 
reveals that the influence of Machiavellianism was a si gn i ficant 
factor in Condition .1. (F 2, 21 = 4.72 p <.02) and , to a somewhat 
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lesser ex~ent also significant in Condition .2 (F 2,21 = 3.73 
--
significant beyond the .05>p confidence level). The results from 
Condition .1, fall into line with those gleaned from the pilot 
study, hence supporting research prediction #1. The results 
from Condition .2 appear to conflict somewhat with the anticipated 
direction of research prediction #2. However, as shall be 
demonstrated in Table 6, rejection of the hypothesis in this case 
need not signify acceptance of the null hypothesis. 
Examination of Table 5 data for Condition ~3 yields (F 2,21 = 
.083 NSD) a strong indication that the influence of Machiavellianism 
has indeed been constrained. Thus, lending support to research 
predictiqn #3 by accepting the hypothesis as stated. 
It must be realized that some variations do not adequately 
reflect the full extent of the restraints /of the finite bargaini ng 
universe within each experimental condition where the point score 
of 20 is an absolute. Placing this into its proper perspective 
both the dependent nature of score acquisition and the significance 
of even a two point spread between the top scorers are factors which 
are not well represented in raw point score analysis. Though game 
score is calculated on a linear ordinal scale, the increments are 
weighted by the particpants in the bargaining situation with 
increasing significance in ascending order. With this in mind , 
the importance of scores which differ, let us say four points between 
highest and lowest players bears more relative impact between 15 and 
1~ (where the player with the lower score must take increased risks , 
prevent any successful plea bargaining, and cope with the add it ional 
Table 6 
CHI-SQUARE COMPARISON OF BARGAINING SUCCESS 
AS A FUNCTION OF MACHIAVELLIANISM 
Experimental Mach Frequency Frequencya 
Condition Group Observed Expected 
1. High 152/377 125.67/377 
Middle 127/377 125.67/377 
Low 98/377 125.67/377 
x2 = 11.62 df2 p<.Ol 
2. High 155/407 135.67/407 
Middle 135/407 135.67/407 
Low 135/407 135.67/407 
x2 = 5.33 df2 p<. 07 
3. High 135/415 138.34/415 
Middle 141/415 138.34/415 
Low 139/415 138.34/415 
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Percent of 
Total 
40.3% 
33.7% 
25.9% 
38% 
33.2% 
28.7% 
32.5% 
33.9% 
33.5% 
aEach Mach group should receive one third of the total points 
therefore, the expected frequency equals 33.33% of the total 
points scored for each experimental condition. 
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stress factor of his opponent's 11 game point 11 status, etc.) than 
the same point devi·a-tfon when players are in mid game between 9 and 
13. This significance is not realized by raw point score F tests, 
hence the possibility of dubious reliability of ANOVA indication 
of significance. Therefore non-parametric measures of the data 
in Table 4 were also taken. 
As shown in Table 6, using the cumulative total technique 
developed in the pilot study, a score is derived which may be 
calculated, via the Chi-Square statistical procedure, against 33.33% 
of the total expected value (i.e. each group should receive an 
equal third of the total points). As one might expect in 
Condition .1, Chi-Square indicated strong support of research 
prediction #1 (X2 = 11.62 df2 p < .01) attesting to a definite influence 
on bargaining success as a function of Machiavellianism Quotient. 
In Condition .2 however, contrary to what was supported by ANOVA, 
the Chi-Square only 11 Suggested 11 a trend (x2 = 5.33 df2 p < .07) toward 
the influence of Machiavellianism . However, convention ordains the 
. 05 level of confidence sacrosanct thus we may accept the hypothesis 
posited in research prediction #2. Significance levels of the da ta 
in Condition 12, as determined by x2 and ANOVA, reveals a slight 
lack of statistical congruence suggesting that partial disclosure 
coupled with increased emphasis on the bargaining task may not have 
as profound an influence on the effects of Machiavellianism as it 
was thought to have. Condition .3, as anticipated yielded no 
signficant difference via Chi-Square (X2 = .14 df2 p> .93) 
supporting the disruption of Machiavellianism's influence in 
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conditions of total disclosure, supporting research prediction #3. 
To further validate the impact of each condition on limiting 
the effects of Machiavellianism on bargaining success, a Pearson •r• 
(correlation coefficient) was calculated to establish significant 
correlations between Mach score and point score. In Condition .1, 
r =59 significant beyond the .01 confidence level; in Conditi on .2, 
r = .39 significant beyond the .05 conficence level; and in 
Condition 13, r = .20 an insignificant slightly negative correlation. 
Again one should note that the results support significance in the 
direction of the research predictions. Having established conf irma-
tion of the Main Hypothesis and the first three research predictions ; 
analysis of changes or modifications of Machiavellian implementati on 
of power strateg1es among conditions which account for the disrupti on 
of Machiavellian influence is now in order: 
Power Stategy Analysis 
The rationale for implementing various power plays has been 
covered in the Power Strategy section of the Pilot Study, for a 
review of same please check Chapter I. Table 7 contains t he raw 
data scores of all subjects separated into Mach groups and di vided 
into the respective experimental conditions. 
The overall pattern of bargaining activity for al l three Mac h 
groups in each experimental condition was vigorous and i n l i ne with 
that observed in the Pilot Study. Directional consistency of · 
results between Condition .1 and the Pilot Study was expect ed, but 
the fact that these consistencies carried almost completely into 
Table 7 
RAW SCORE COMPARISON OF BARGAINING STRATEGIES 
BY MACH GROUP 
Condition . 1: 
High Mach 
Middle Mach 
Low Mach 
High Mach 
Middle ~·1ach 
Low Mach 
Condition . 2 : 
High Mach 
Middle Mach 
Low Mach 
Controller 
46 
54 
32 
B o 1 d Ch a 11 en ge 
14 
16 
8 
Controller 
60 
64 
44 
Plea Bargain Coalition 
Made Accepted 
24 22 44 
21 10 32 
8 5 28 
Correct Incorrect 
12 2 
7 9 
2 6 
Plea Bargain Coalition 
Made Accepted 
28 26 51 
23 14 38 
10 7 33 
56 
% 
42% 
30% 
26% 
% 
85.7% 
43.7% 
25% 
% 
41% 
31% 
27% 
High Mach 
Middle Mach 
Low Mach 
Condition . 3: 
High Mach 
Middle Mac·h 
Low Mach 
High Mach 
Middle Mach 
Low Mach 
Bo 1 d Ch a 11 en ge 
10 
18 
12 
Controller 
84 
68 
38 
Bo 1 d Ch a 11 en ge 
24 
16 
14 
Correct 
10 
10 
4 
Plea Bargain 
Made Accepted 
21 
16 
12 
13 
12 
9 
Correct 
10 
8 
6 
Incorrect 
0 
8 
8 
Coalition 
29 
46 
37 
Incor"rect 
14 
8 
8 
57 
% 
100% 
55.5% 
33.33% 
% 
25% 
41% 
33% 
% 
41% 
50% 
42% 
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Condition .2 w~s quite unanticipated. Generally speaking, high 
Machs in the first two conditions, while no more active than middle 
or low Machs, consistently succeeded in maintaining a slight but 
statistically non-significant advantage over their triad mates in 
the Controller and Plea Bargain modes. As suggested in the Pilot 
Study this constant "edge" may have some cumulative effect on 
bargaining success but such speculation has, at this time, no 
statistical support.. On the other hand, both the Bold Challenge 
mode and Coalition for Majority formation proved to be significant 
factors in determining bargaining outcomes. As shown in Table 8 
a Chi-Square reveals high Mach superiority in both Conditions .1 
and .2 to be significantly enhanced by effective manipulation of 
the Bold Challenge power strategy. 
As displayed in Table 8, Condition .3's disclosure factor 
' 
inhibits effective application of the Bold Challenge power strategy . 
It is also quite apparent that full disclosure, rather than task 
orientation, limits the ability of high Machs to control the 
bargaining structure by dominating Coalition for Majority formation. 
Whether high Machs initiated the majority of the coalitions that 
they participated in or whether they were selected (prior to 
Condition . 3) on the basis of "preferred partner" status is a moot 
point. The fact remains that high Machs tend to be in the majori ty 
of winning coalitions so long as their high Mach-ness is not 
specifically revealed. If the high Mach's personality type is 
disclosed he enters -significantly fewer coalitions. 
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Table 8 
POWER STRATEGY SIGNIFICANT FACTOR CHI-SQUARE CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS 
BOLD CHALLENGE MODE: 
Condition .1: 
x2 = 9.07 
df2 
p <.02 
Conditions .1-X-.2 
x2 == .0063 
df2 
p >. 99 
Condition .2: 
x2 = 10.37 
df2 
p < • 01 
COALITION for MAJORITY: 
Conditions .1-X-.3 
x2 = 6.553 
df2 
p <.05 
Condition .3: 
x2 = .2892 
df2 
p >.86 
Conditions .2-X-.3 
x2 = 6.625 
df2 
p <,.05 
Significant change in the : utilization of important 
bargaining strategies by h.igh Machs between · conditions ·· .l and 
.3, with a corresponding drop in outcomes, reconfirms the 
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major hypothesis and supports research prediction #4. Hence, 
it seems reasonable to interpret this as evidence that situational 
threat via personality type disclosure, minimizes · individual 
differences in bargaining abilities and manipulative skills 
due to Machiavellianism Quotient. 
Analysis of Other Factors Influencing Outcomes 
I t i s. i n s uf f i c i en t mere 1 y to " d i s cover " that Mach i ave 11 i an i s m 
ceases to have a significant effect on bargaining success in 
conditions where full disclosure prevail; without attempting to 
understand why this is so. What exactly js it about 
Machiavellian bargaining tactics which was forced to change or 
become inoperative between Condition .1 and Condition .3? 
Several factors not classified as power strategies per se 
appear to have a definite influence on the communication patterns, 
hence upon the bargaining outcomes, which typify Machiavellian 
behavior. These factors include: adapting well to 
artificially accelerated game play by exhibiting the ability 
to make speedy decisions; apparent cooperation coupled with 
tenacious intent to achieve the optimum outcomes; the ability 
to define "fairness" to the satisfaction of other members in the 
triad which in turn determines the structure of bargaining; and 
single minded attention to the immediate bargaining outcome in 
terms of s uper1 or ~~sj t ion, 1 n essence lltoughness" of 
b~rgaining stance. These four · factors seem· almost to 
contradict one another, yet they account for much of the high 
Mach's success in the base condition (Condition .1) and lack 
of same in the fully disclosed condition (Condition .3). 
Speed Factor 
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A priori assumptions 1n the past confined most of t he game 
theory analysis solely to the mathematics of absolute conflict 
of interest, forced rationality of outcomes amongst 
participants, mutual knowledge of outcomes, and agreement 
as to the rank order of strategic preferences; this type of 
abstracted formalism has often elicited severe criticism as to 
general applicability. One such criticism levied against the 
present study attacks a possible elemental flaw in 
operationalization; that the sine qua non, forced quick 
decisions, are not truly representative of communication and 
behavior which produce the same outcomes as would occur natural ly. 
Can the compression-of-time factor actually be equated with 
situations where decisions are made in a slow and deliberate 
manner? 
In line with Durkin's (1967) analysis of the cogniti ve 
dichotomy existing between high and low Machs, is the observation 
in this thesis that high Machs more so than lows enjoy a hi gh 
tension "snap decision" bargaining environment. The reason 
for this may be quite simple; the pressure of forcing speedy 
decisions increases stress upon the b~rgainers which in turn 
enhances irrelevant affect - a main criterion for optimum 
expression of Machiavellianism. In Condition .1 the high 
Machs were able to keep the b~rgaining pace accelerated · 
perhaps because all participants th~ught this was part of the 
game's purpose, that speedy decision in some way pleased t he 
experimenter or was encouraged by him, or simply because the 
sooner the game was over the sooner someone would be 
declared a winner and everyone could the~ go about his da i ly 
business. However, in Condition .3, high Mach attempts 
to pick up the bargaining pace were met with both passive and 
active resistance. Passive resistance took the form of 
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asking the experimenter for technique card rereadings tota lli ng 
24% more than asked for in Condition .1. Active resistance 
manifested itself in substantially more intra group communication 
directed toward individuals who pressured for accelerated 
decision making, in the form of retorts demanding time to think. 
Several subjects commented on the fact that they fe l t t he 
game made them rush into a decision which normally they woul d 
have pondered longer or not made at all if they weren't more 
positive of the results. The applicability of this research 
then may be more directly significant for crisis type barga ining 
decision making than for lengthy negotiation. Taking th i s 
notion one step further; mightn't the Machiavellian persona lity 
variable as established in Condition .1 and Condit i on .2 , 
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be a factor which _h_~_l_gs secure early advant.ages in b~rgaining 
- an immediate phenomenon - the impact of which may very well 
be reduced as the relationships am~ng the participants develop, 
mature, and stabilize as a function of extended interaction -
a longitudinal phenomenon - effecti.ng disclosure similar to 
that which affected results in Condition .3? 
Cooperation 
Bargaining is likely to be more active when at least one 
of the participants profoundly exhibits those tendencies 
indicated .by high Machiavellianism Quotient pretests, and at 
least one of the other individuals in the triad exhibits an 
attitude of passive cooperation. Any exploitative and 
manipulative behavior is then revealed in bold relief when 
contrasted with the docile and dependent actions of very 
cooperative lower Machs. Successful bargaining fluctuates 
between these two extremes with the largest continual gains 
made by those individuals who "appear 11 to espouse egalitarian 
attitudes while taking advantage of the other participants. 
In most situations the best policy, in terms of maximizing 
gains, seems to be one tending toward cooperation but actively 
goal directed, such than flexibility does not interfere with 
success orientation. 
Expressed throughout this thesis are many statements 
of theoretical possibility which maintain that personality 
is important to the communication process which determines the 
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outcomes duri.ng a b~rga i ni.ng situation, contending that each 
participant brings to the situation -propensities to communicate 
in certain general ways, and within the situation their 
personality variables interact with environmental characteristics 
to determine specific behaviors and outcomes. This idea 
conceived in the framework of the above stated bargaining 
conditions suggests that the differences observed between Condition 
.1 and Condition .3 can be explained as personality variable 
-X- experimental situation interaction. 
Fairness 
As odd as it may sound, effective manipulation often 
depends upon one's wielding the pressure of "fairness;" 
for without this concept bargainers find it difficult to 
quickly make and accept the concessions necessary to reach an 
agreement. Fairness and "honesty 11 should not in this case be 
misconstrued to mean the same thing. An adept player can 
misrepresent his interests either by hyperbole or understatement 
and secure an agreement which is factually to his distinct 
advantage, although it would appear quite fair to his opponents. 
High Machs tended to control the "definition of fairness" 
discussions in Condition .1 and .2 by virtue of their self cast 
leadership role. In Condition .3 however, any discussion 
initiated or directed by the high Mach was apt to elicit 
responses from the other triad members insinuating or boldly 
maintaining that some greater ulterior motive was behind such 
discussions. Not unexpectedly middle Machs in this condition 
often 11 Mached-out" higher Machs :· by forcing them into a 
secondary control position or distracting them from the 
immediate task at hand via irrelevant innuendo concerning 
evil and manipulative Machiavellian people. 
Toughness 
Since bargaini_ng ;·s basically a process whereby positions 
that are divergent become 11 identical" allowing par es who 
disagree initially to reach a mutual agreement; bargaining fer 
coalition can therefore be viewed as either a series of 
decreasing demands or an all-or-nothing situation. The 
outcome of every reading in which bargaining took place 
was analyzed by comparing the number of t!mes a subject made 
a demand and was allotted a concession with the frequency 
that he rejected a lesser counter-proposal, thus deriving a 
general measure of "toughness. 11 A "tough 11 bargainer was 
one who started with high demands and made concessions 
infrequently; whereas 11 Softness" in bargaining was indicated 
by low initial demands and a subject's willingness to accept 
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any counter-proposal. In each reading then, the final outcome 
of bargaining as reflected in point score accrued by each 
subject yielded a rough index of bargaining success as a 
function of toughness or softness. 
Irrespective of Mach grouping, as a subject participated 1n 
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successive experiments, his b~rga in i ng neither.· grew ·. '.' to.ugher" nor 
"softer. 11 Thus passage of time ·in the bargaining situations 
p~r se does not appear to alter · an individual's style bf 
bargaining for coalition. Unfortunately this research 
design had no definitive means for measuring the actual degrees 
to which the toughness/softness variable influenced specific 
bargaining outcomes. Generally speaki~g, high and middle 
Machs were tougher and successfully controlled their situations , 
tending to continue being tough throughout the experiments . 
Conversely, low Mach subjects tended to drive soft bargains 
as a result of the toughness displayed by one or both of his 
opponents, rather than a function of any conciliatory attitude 
displayed by an opponent. There was virtually no difference 
.. 0 
between the proportion of higher Machs who responded to 
concession by making a concession and those who responded by 
not making one. 
Examination of exhibitions of toughness/softness across all 
conditions suggests that it is not so much that toughness was 
a good strategy, but rather, that softness was a poor one. 
Except in the Plea Bargain mode, an extremely soft bargaining 
strategy tended to place the individual on the outside of any 
coalition formed. Low Mach players were three times as 
likely as high Machs to exhibit "extremely" soft bargaining 
strategies. Softness in th~ Bold Challenge mode actually 
hindered progress toward any coalition or non-punitive form 
of resolution. Comparison of the Plea Bargain and the Bo l d 
Chall~nge mode rey~gls that t~ughness plays a dual role, oft 
times with contradictory consequences. While toughness 
decreases the likelihood of a Plea B~rga·1n Coalition; it 
increases the payoff for those who survive the possibility 
of failure in the Bold Challenge mode. 
In the Coalition for Majority mode, where bargaining 
is relatively flexible, t~ughness proved to be a bad strategy 
in the majority of the cases. High Machs were the most able 
"tough" b~rgainers, however, middle Machs employed the 
technique as frequently but gained an average of 23% fewer 
points across all conditions. It should be noted that the 
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total information, fully disclosed condition, yielded the 
fewest successful attempts as 11 toughness," suggesting that the 
more accurate a bargainerts information is about their 
opponents, the more likely toughness is to prevent coalition. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Restatement of Major Findings 
High Machs were more successful as predicted than low Machs in 
mixed-motive bargaining coalition situations. Much of this success 
is attributed to their superior manipulative abilities, lack of 
emphasis on conventional ethical standards, and a detached approach 
to interpersonal functioning. Until such time as Machiavellian 
Quotients were disclosed, participants controlled the balance of 
bargaining power, both in leadership and judgment, to their advantage 
in proportion to their respective Machiavellianism Quotients. 
Disclo.sure of the Nature of Machiavellianism, emphasis on task 
orientation, and particularly the impact of revealing each individual 1 S 
Machiavellianism Quotient to all members of the bargaining triad were 
shown to negate any innate or acquired superior manipulative skill 
possessed by a member Machiavellian. In short, the effects of 
Machiavellianism on bargaining success were limited 1) personally 
labeling Machiavellian individuals as manipulators, and to a lesser 
extent 2) stressing the need for all participants to concentrate on 
the task at hand. 
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Condition l; Pilot Study Revisited 
Quoting from page 2 3 in Chapter I, typi.ca 1 game p 1 ay " revea 1 s 
the 'disadvantaged' lowest. are not, as one might expect, helpless, 
but rather are taken unawar.e. The next higher Mach, often the most 
active and certainly one of the most .powerful players, presses for 
advantage too impetuously, succombing less to the inherent superior-
ity of his opponents than to his own judgmental errors. By thi s 
same token, the more successful and powerful high Mach players are 
aggressive but cautious, appealing to the sensibilities of their 
opponents while constantly (almost .. relentlessly) seeking the 
advantage. Without intending to sound melodramatic, high Machs 
almost 'mesmerize' others into committing some concentration shift 
where inadvertent blundering, the factor between winning and not 
winning, decides the outcome in favor of the highest Mach." 
Restatement of research prediction #1; in Condition .1, high 
Machs will successfully out bargain lower Machs and receive a 
significant and disproportionately large share of the outcomes which 
will result in high Machs winning more games. 
Brtefly reviewing the chronology of events in Condition .1 
bargaining one notes that there is some indication that for the firs t 
third of the ·game all players interact more or less as equals. 
During this time much 11 table talk 11 • probing, examination of other 
player's attitudes, and reality/knowledge testing transpires among 
participants. It becomes increasingly obvious that internal struggles 
are taking place; with one (or more) of the players, usually a higher 
Mach, making an effort to impose their value system, enhance personal 
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believability, and dominate the attention of the other players between 
readings. The initial all-for-one alliance attitude quickly trans-
forms into a conditional situation where positivr~ and negative inter-
personal rewards are being used as the fulcrum for coalition forma-
tion. Hence, either promoting future mutually beneficial interactions 
(e.g. 11 Keep up the good work. dude. 11 ), soothing injured egos (e.g. 
'
1 damn game is trickier than I thought. . . . but we 1 11 get it together 
next time. 11 ), or · a si 1 ent battle. of w.ill s between at 1 east two players 
in whi.ch a substantia 1 effort is made either to . 11 psych-outu the 
competition or appear to be totally aloof. 
The turning point of the game usually takes place about 3/5 ths 
into the readings (8 to 10 techniques read), at which time one player 
, 
has begun to 11 fall by the wayside11 and the conflict is bei ng carried 
on between two approxima-tely equal opponents.. At. this point t he 
critical errors are most likely to occur (e.g. too little concen t ra tion 
before attaining the control position, emotionally motivate Bold 
Cha 11 enges, hasty forming ·of · uns·tab 1 e co a 1 i ti ons, etc. ) as we 11 as the 
"tough 11 but subtle power plays (e.g. Controller made Bold Challenges , 
Coalition for Majority with no acceptance .of Plea Bargainers, etc. ) 
The final 20%. of the game is usually either 1) a struggle agains t 
the most likely coalition by the odd-person out (at this point t he 
lowest. score player usually poses no threat and is sought for partner-
ship by the other players), or 2) cautious bargaining by one player 
(or perhaps two) uttempting to slow or halt the advances of another. 
Ultimately there is a winner or winning coalition, usually bei ng or 
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containing the highest Mach. 
There are seven generally prominent bargaining features observable 
in almost every triad in Condition .1: 
1) High and middle Machs initiate cooperation the most; low 
Machs do so least. 
2) High Machs wield -Bold Challenge power most effectively whereas 
middle .and low Machs were less adept at same. 
3) High Machs, as anticipated, exhibit the most successful 
efforts to manipulate others. Cons.istent with their perform-
ance 1n the Pilot Study, low Machs had far the fewest succes-
ful attempts at manipulation. 
4) High Machs tend to respond quickly to the changes in their 
partner's behavior, and attempt to "punish 11 another's shift 
from cooperation to antagonism. 
5) low Machs di -scrim.i nated between the o·ther Mach groups ·w; thin 
the triad preferring high Machs during bargaining, middle 
Machs preferred high slightly more than low Machs, while 
high Machs exhibited no signs of preference. (It is 
interesting to note that this tendency was expressed in both 
the Coalition for Majority and the Plea Bargain modes.) 
6) High Machs tend to control conversations which discuss 
proportionment of outcomes. 
7) Low Machs frequently exhibit "softness 11 in their barga in i ng 
styles as a function of the "toughness 11 ex hi bi ted by higher 
Machs. 
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Such differences, as stated above, between high and low .Mach 
behavior may be accoun-t"ed for through 11 encounter-theory 11 (Durkin 
1967) "The Cool Syndrome vs the Soft Touch" philosophy (Christie 
and Ge.is 1970) 11 rationality vs vulnerability .. (Burgoon et. al. 1974) , 
or by this author•s concept of personality and environmental 
bargaining situation interaction in which all bargainers are confli ct 
assertive or conflict interactive. 
In this concept high Machs in Condition .1; exhibit conflict 
assertive/resolution directive communication and behavior, while 
low Machs opt for the path of least resistance; that being conflict 
submi ss i ve/reso 1 uti on. interactive. Needless to say middle Machs 
fluctuate somewhere between these extremes. The· Machiavellian 
personality pretest measures only indicate an individual's pre-
disposition to accepting dominant or less dorrrinant roles in mixed-
motive bargaining coalition situations. Whereas during the actual 
bargaining interactions a multitude of factors either facilitate or 
inhibit implementation of tactics or strategies which directly in-
fluence the final outcomes and dependent upon these factors, 
Machiavellianism . is either advantageous or not. 
Condition .2, A Closer Look 
Restating research prediction #2; when all subjects are speci-
fically instructed to concentrate on optimizing the bargaining task 
to overcome the influence of a skilled Machiavellian manipula tor in 
their midst; high Machs will win somewhat more points than low Machs , 
but the margin of difference will not be as profound as in 
research prediction #., -.--
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Emphasizing task orientation and establishing that the triad 
consisted of one each high, middle, and low Mach; with an accom-
panying dialogue on what -Machiavellianism is and how it effects 
bargaining situations, had . only one discerni.ble effect, all Mach 
groups did slightly better than they had in Condition .1. This 
would lead one to conclude that while it is true that such infor-
mation does indeed .help non-Machiavellians compete in the bargaini ng 
situation, it also provides such incentive for Machiavellians. 
Hence, it is· incorrect to assume, as Burgoon et. a 1 ( 197 4, p. 44) 
suggests that such information will minimize the influence of a 
high Mach. In actuality this strategy simply heightens the focus 
of all participants without regard for Machtavellianism Quotient. 
Low Machs continue to lose in spite of partial disclosure, appear 
to be unconcerned or unable to discern that their most frequently 
11 Chosen 11 partner was indeed the high Mach, and .by several low 
Mach subject's own admission proceeded with the bargaining irre-
spective of any titles or personality types included in pregame 
discussion. High Machs, on the other hand, kept their attentions 
on the goal uninvolved with their interest in the implicit infor-
mation regarding Mach grouping. 
High Machs tended to use the information that each triad was 
constructed according to Mach quotient as a strategic barricade 
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from which to launch a smoke screen of "distrust" and "accusation". 
This provided sufficient irrelevant affect ·to more than compensate 
for any increase in outcome realized ·by low Machs perhaps contami-
nating any resultant increase brought about through heightened 
concentration on the bargaining task. 
Condition .2, produced three times as many verbal contracts 
between players as di.d Condition .1. Six of these agreements to 
establish continuing but information coalitions were formed; in-
cludi-ng . . a high Mach and a low Mach. in three instances, a high and 
a middle Mach in two, and a high, middle, and low i n one instance. 
Humorously enough, it was often the actual high Mach of the group who 
pointed out to one of the other members of the triad that the t hird 
player's actions could only be construed to be the manipulations of 
a 11 Machiavellian type" and in this manner turned the focus of 
attentions from himself by establishing a "common enemy". 
The contrast effect of this common enemy tended to diminish 
mutual differences between allies, providing an outgroup part ici-
pant for negative reference. Thus, in effect, minimizing perceived 
differences within a dyadic group by increasing conflict between 
that group and the remaining person in ·the triad. The very 
suggestion of this type accusation stimulated the competitive con-
flict situation, increasing distrust and in two instances severely 
reduced group communication either to or from the excluded par ty. 
Seemingly, the more the ousted bargainer attempts to persuade the 
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others to his side, the more the others reject his information as 
--
being merely attempts at manipulation; this fact was even more 
clearly displayed ir. Condition 3. 
Obviously it is possible for- any participant to attempt a 
direct influence. attempt surreptitiously; with the identifying 
characteristics of such an attempt that the perpetrator of the in-
tended manipulation behaves and initiates corrnnunication as if the 
target individual(s) can not or do not perceive the perpetrator's 
own interests in accomplishing said manipulation. Naturally some 
perpetrators are rather i-nept, clumsy, and obvious in their mani-
pulative attempts apparently only marginally aware that :heir 
target is not deceived by the tactics being used. One manifesta-
tion of conflict assertive/resolution directive high Mach strategy 
is that they rarely appear to succumb to obvious or blatant mani-
pulations, when such tactics if discovered would be disadvantageous. 
Generally, the high . Mach successfully perpetrates manipulative 
attempts upon his target in a manner which, quite frequently in 
Condition .2, results in the target expressing great satisfaction 
at the 11 Victory" which, to a major extent, was had at his conflict 
submissive/resolution interactive expense! 
Drawn from the comments made during and after bargaining 
sessions by low Machs in Condition .2, there is a possibility that 
a significant factor between low and high Mach performance is 
that low Machs assume that their partners are "Just like themu, 
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thereby attributing low Mach motives to Machiavellian behavior. 
Though equally motivated to participate, low Machs neglect to 
manipulate the situation to their own best advantage, erroneously 
assuming that the egalitarianism and fair play espoused by their 
opponents will triumph. This is not only an ineffective but a 
losing strategy. Unfortunately no formal posttest was adminis-
tered to confirm this contention, hence it must be considered 
speculation. 
Condition .3, Affecting the Effect 
Restate~ent of research prediction #3; full disclosure of the 
nature of Machiavellianism, coupled with revelation of the 
Machiavellianism Quotient of each participant, should effectively 
equalize and limit any effects on bargaining /due to Machiavellian-
ism. Hence, no statistically significant score disparity among 
participants will occur. 
Comparison of the three experimental conditions reveals; that 
the Machiavellian uses many strategies to resolve conflicts of 
interest, his adeptness at same leads to concessions by naive 
opponents resulting in successfully shifting the bargaining out-
come in his favor (Condition .1), where competent implementation 
of strategies results in superior manipulation cf available power. 
Power deficiencies may even be overcome by intelligent employment 
of various subversive or misrepresentative strategies (Condition 
.2). However, especially over repeated interactions, strategies 
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and bargaining styles associated with deception, unfairness, 
and manipulative intent are learned by the opposition, resulting 
in the development of reactive counter-strategies, (Condition .3) 
which in turn produces a level of 11 bargaining awareness 11 involving 
correspondingly negative or aversive conditions which will not 
necessarily be surmounted via implementation of a strategy - in 
fact, the reverse is true, once the deceptive nature of Machiavellian 
strategy is disclosed, the merest exhibition of competitive bargain-
ing by the person so accused results in the escalation of conflict 
and a resultant decline in his outcomes. 
The bas~ of a Machiavellian's influence on bargaining is success-
fully implementing power to affect another's responses; hence, the 
crux of much of the intricate and subtle behavior which constitutes 
11 bargaining 11 in a mixed-motive situation in the fully revealed con-
dition. A high Mach's use of power to affect the other bargainer's 
outcomes adversely often adversely affected his own outcome, hence 
he was less likely to resort to manipulative behavior. 
In one instance a twice successful top scorer high Mach reacted 
so negatively to the disclosure in Condition .3 that he refused to 
make or acknowledge any bargaining offers. He limited his partici-
pation to Bold Challenges and consistently chose the previous 
reading's correct response as his answer. This strategy resulted i n 
the lengthiest time of play (38 readings), and had virtually the 
same effect as refusing to respond at all; thereby reducing the 
immediate outcomes for all players. 
What in essence occurs is a bargainer's natural predis-
position to accept his usual conflict assertive/resolution 
directive role is thwarted; which simply means that someone else 
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must, to a greater or lesser extent, fulfill that function. The 
thwarted or deposed individual has several alternatives: a) He may 
accept a more secondary role (e.g. conflict assertive/resolution 
submissive) and hope for the best outcome possible; b) He can 11 90 
it11 alone and attempt to maintain his comfortable role; c) He can 
refuse to participate, inhibit communication, and generally attempt 
to disrupt the bargaining; and d) He can discredit the source which 
forced his deposition, change bargaining situations, or if he allows 
sufficient time to pass, win by default. The ideas espoused here-
/ 
in, though 11 0riginal 11 , are not new. Surprisingly enough, every one 
of these suggestions and several more can be gleaned from the works 
of a Florentine secretary, one Niccolo Machiavelli; strange how 
little the nature of man, bargains, conflict and communication change 
in over six centuries. 
Conclusions 
The major disadvantage of using Mach tests, or any paper and 
pencil measure designed to test for a specific personality var i able, 
is that their value is limited by not revealing more of the t ot al 
personality. Therefore, problem areas regarding validity and 
reliability manifest themselves immediately upon generalization 
- . -
from the simplest controlled conditions to conditions which are 
either more complex or less controlled. Comparison of the three 
conditions indicates that the communication process during bar-
gaining is affected by factors of both personality and situation 
suggesting an interaction effect. If indeed this is so, future 
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researchers might do well to manipulate other situational variables 
to discover those situations in which personality differences 
account for greater· and lesser impacts on connnunication. At 
present, the chasm between the controlled laboratory environment 
and 11 real-11fe" situations is observed as a formidable obstacle 
in the task of creating a scientific approach to conflict resolu-
tion via communication research. This gap may be crossed if the 
/ 
same "laws 11 govern events in both conditions - as no such universal 
laws are readily discernible in human interactions, the bridge 
must therefore develop from the study of mini-conflicts with clearly 
defined and controlled issues, progressing to larger conflicts with 
more poorly defined goals observed by convoluted issues. Additional 
conflict research investigating interpersonal communication vari-
ables must be undertaken using this laboratory gestation period to 
give birth to a viable theory of bargaining applicable not only to 
rational conflict, but, more importantly, to the resolution of that 
conflict. 
While broad generalization is impossible, the importance of a 
80 
study such as this should not be downplayed because it investi-
gates atypical personality effects. It would appear likely that 
in "real-life 11 situations it is the atypical personality which often 
plays the major role. Consequently, future communication research-
ers would do well to further investigate atypical personalities, 
especially if those personalities tend to typify individuals 
responsible for developing situations which are of specific interest 
to the researcher. 
In conclusion, there are undoubtedly a multitude of areas of 
improvement for future researchers investigating personality effects 
on communication during bargaining. Six such areas of concern are 
readily apparent: improved personality measurement; more complex 
experimental situations; increased attention to the interaction of 
/ 
personality variables and environmental situations; more attention 
to motivations and incentives behind manipulative or non-manipula-
tive behaviors; utilization of more specific indices to log, by 
type and impact, communication which enhances bargaining efficacy; 
and conceiving of personality variables as roughly equivalent to 
valences in chemistry such that a bargaining situation and its 
limits may be considered in elemental terms as equations capable 
of determining outcomes prior to conflict. 
The interaction of all input factors effects the predisposition 
to communication within small groups. Irrespective of content, 
the communication patterns which evolve within the group establish 
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three basic classifications of variables: task orientation, inter-
personal characteristics, and procedural development; all interact 
affecting the resultant communication. Adequate assessment of 
the determinants which control the ratio between quality and quantity 
of effective communication to reach an agreement is impossible unless 
those factors which influence the process of persuasion can be 
isolated and understood. To desire knowledge concerning communi-
cation i·nherent in small group bargaining interactions, but to dis-
regard investigation of the elements which may be the key variables 
of the persuasive process undermines any value of communication 
research. The implications gleaned by studying personality 
variable interactions and limitations related to effective propagan-
dizing, not only provides additional answers about communication, but 
/ 
also fosters inductive insight into the validity of applying these 
(and other similar) principles to business management, motivational 
seminars; and a variety of seemingly mundane competitive bargaining 
situations where 11 persuasion 11 is not merely a matter of semantics, 
but the intended purpose of the interaction. 
SUBJECTS: 
High Mach; 
APPENDIX A 
Rotation Procedure 
#1 #2 #3 
Middle Mach; #4 #5 #6 
Low Mach; #7 #8 #9 
GROUPS IN TRIAD: 
Condition . . 1 Condition .2 
I : #1, #4, #7 IV: #1, #5' #9 
I I : #2, #5' #8 V: #2' #6' #7 
I I I : #3, #6' #9 VI: #3, #4, #8 / 
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Condition . 3 
VI I : #1' #6' #8 
VIII: #2' #4' #9 
IX: #3, #5' #7 
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Rules ·of the Game 
1. Prejudice/Ridicule: 
Prejudices exarnp le: A you.ng man wishi.ng to make a good 
impression on his girlfriend's father, learns that he is a rabid 
Democrat. So one evening, while waiting for the daughter . to 
finish dressing, he engages the "old man" in conversation, 
turning it in such a way as to rip the Republicans to pieces. 
The father later informs the girl that the young man has "good 
stuff in him and should go far. 11 Meaning: The one who makes 
the appeal to persuade you to act or feel in a certain way by 
associating his person, product, or proposal with a certain 
one of your prejudices, positive or negative--a prejudice being 
a prejudgment wrapped in emotion and having a history . Not 
only does he rekindle your prejudice, he also arouses in you 
feelings of kinship for one who shares your prejudice (i .e. 
himself)--and so exploits you through your weakness. 
Ridi~ule example: The professor , on the first day of 
class, having made a certain statement, is asked · an embarass in g 
question by a class member. Preferring a cheap victory to an 
honest discussion, the professor replies sarcastically, "I'm 
afraid Mr. Jones, that I cannot understand what you mean. You 
are too deep for me. 11 He then goes on to the next questioner. 
Meaning: An attempt is made to influence .. us to accept a 
certain proposition by poking fun at those who oppose it, 
or to discredit their counter proposal by subjecting them to 
verbal abuses. 
2. Abstraction-Ambiguity-Diversion: 
Abstration example: A speaker defines ''Neurosis" as a 
11 psychological term for a state of mind involvi.ng the nerves, " 
but when he is asked to identify or point to--among a large 
number of people--a case of neurosis, he is unable to do so, 
showing that he is unable to use the term to make any concre t e 
distinctions. Meaning: An abstracted term is a word or 
symbol which stands for the qualities possessed in common 
by a number of particular things, facts, or events. The 
technique of abstract terms occurs when an arguer employs 
a word for which he may have the meaning in he form of 
other words, but the arguer is unable to identify the 
concrete facts to which the word supposedly refers. 
Ambiguity example: Joe says, "Henry likes pudding be tter 
than his wife." Does Henry like pudding better than he likes 
his wife or does Henry like pudding more than his wife likes 
pudding? Meaning: A word or phrase is ambiguous if in the 
mind of a hearer or c~ader it·has two or more quite different 
meanings and the interpreter is uncertain as to which was 
rea 11 y me ant. 
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Diversion example: Teacher: "Johnny, what were you · doing 
outside during study hall? 11 Johnny: "Oh, I dunno . Say 
did you know that the School . Nurse and Mr. Higgins the janitor 
go down into the basement t.ogether?" Teacher: 11 No! Really! 
I wonder what they would go there for?" Meaning: To divert 
is to get off the subject. With the original issue left 
unresolved, perhaps to join in a discussion or argument over 
some other unrelated subject. 
3. Rationalization/Pity: 
Rationalization example: The student, having failed . the 
test, blames his failure on the classroom•s being too hot .. 
so hot in fact that he just could not think. Whereas in 
reality he knows that not enough time was spent in study, 
hence his .failure. Meaning: You cite reasons or causes that 
will justify action that really has less creditable grounds . 
Pity Example: Student to professor: "I know that my 
test grades have been poor, and that I deserve an 'F' , but 
my dad is in the hospital and it would just kill him for me 
to get an 'F' in this course .. " Meaning: -· An attempt is 
being made to secure a commitment by presenting the object 
of commitment as an object of sympathy, thereby arousing 
our sympathetic feelings to the point where these feelings 
determine favorable action. 
4. Wishful Thinking/Oversimplification: 
Wishful Thinking example: "My daughter will be chosen 
Home-Coming-Queen, because she ought to win after all her 
long hard preparation." Meaning: You believe a proposi t ion 
to be true because you want it to be true. 
Oversimplification example: "If it were not for the 
ammunition makers, we would never have wars. 11 Meaning: A 
complex event is explained by references to only one or two 
probable causes whereas many are responsible. 
5. Flattery-Status-Manner: 
Flattery example: Salesman to young matron answering the 
door: "This is my 1 ucky day. . . to be greeted at the door 
by not only the most youthful and attractive woman on this 
street, but obviously, by the look of your house, also t he most 
conscientious." M~_aning: An attempt is made to secure our 
c om~i tmen t . by p 0 i n"t i n g . 0 ut i n a very favor a b 1 e 1 i gh t , s orne 
man1festat1on of our personal appearance, intellect or some 
other category where we wish to excel. 
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Status example: "Sud so was deve 1 oped in the 1 aboratory of 
a great and famous University. It's got to be good!" 
Meaning: Persons., places, or objects for which we have a 
strong sentiment of respect and -esteem- or which at least 
possess some degree of fame or prestige - are introduced into 
the argument as endorsing that which we are asked to buy or 
be 1 i eve. 
Manner ex amp 1 e: "I • m sure he's the president of this 
university. Notice the way he carries himself and the 
condescending way in which he speaks to those students. 11 
Meaning: A person's manner of behaving is made the basis of 
our acceptance or rejection of then without any thought that 
this manner may be a deceptive indicator of value. 
6. Acceptable to the Dubious/Draw the Line, Moderatism-Radicalism: 
Acceptable to the Dubious example: Advertisement: "The 
boys in the ~ervice abroad want letters more than gifts. Write 
frequently because some letters get lost. Write only good news 
because there is enough unpleasantry going ~ on over there. Buy 
and write on Barton's Victory-Bond Stationary and we'll win this 
damned war." Meaning: The arguer states a series of 
propositions. The earlier ones 'are readily acceptable to the 
audience or reader, but the later ones are dubious. The listener 
is expected to blindly accept the latter ones because of what 
preceded them. 
Draw the Line example: 11 Either you tell the truth or you 
lie." Meaning: Sharp distinctions are drawn where it is 
inappropriate to draw sharp distinctions. 
Moderatism-Radicalism example: "What we need is new ideas, 
completely new ways of thinking; the old is not worthy of 
our acceptance." . . . vs . . . "Vote for me. My Radi ca 1-
Middle party is neither conservative nor radical, we refuse 
to take a stand on any specific issue, but we sure can 
compromise ... just think FM as the party which sits on 
the fence with both ears to the ground." Meaning: These 
quasi-politi-al habits of the mind are similar to prejudice 
in form, but prejudice has history whereas Moderatism-
Radicalism (or the reverse as depicted above) has neither 
history nor rational construction. The dichotomy between 
new for newness sake/old for oldness sake vs total avoidance 
of any extremes to the point or refusing to make a stand on 
any issue; there is no inherent virtue in either. 
7. Practical Conse9uences/Attacking a Straw-Man: 
Practical Consequences example: To paraphrase the movie 
''fhe Godfather~~: Make em an offer that they can 1 t refuse. 11 
Meaning: An effort is made to persuade us to comply based 
on concern for our individual welfare due to harmful 
influences. 
Attacking a Straw-Man example: Forbes: "A good 
portion of the best high school students never get to 
college. They just don•t have the money. 11 Busby: "Forbes, 
what you want is to pay kids to go to college ... how 
absurd!" Meaning: Your opponent either 1) restates your 
position falsely or 2) exaggerates its consequences. 
8. Bandwagon/Bargain: 
Bandwagon example: 11 Join the winners, vote for Senator 
Simpkins . 11 Meaning: An effort is made to influence 
you to act in a certain way by asserting or implying that 
that is popular or what the majority is doing. 
Bargain example: Display in a store: "SPECIAL 45¢ 
each new Ruskin tomatoes. 11 Upon examination of the shelf, 
the regular price is found to be two for 90¢. Meaning: 
An attempt is made to get you to buy by appealing to your 
desire to save money ... hoping that you will not 
investigate the situation by price comparison, quality etc. 
9. Begging or Leading the Question: 
, 
Begging the Question example: 11 Man is a social animal 
because he is gregarious. 11 Meaning: This technique 
involves assuming as true what has yet to be proved. 
Frequently a similar (or the same) proposition is used 
both as arguw~ntal premise and as conclusion. This may 
be done either by 1) the use of synonymous terms or 2) by 
circular argument, which involves the use of A to prove B 
and B to prove A. 
Leading the Question example: 11 Tell me Jones, have you 
stopped beat i n g your c h i l dr en yet? 11 Me an i n g : A 1 e ad i n g 
question is one which 1) dictates or suggests an answer or 
2) one which incriminates the answer no matter how he answers. 
10. No Technique: 
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No Technique example: "I believe in Federal Aid to 
Education. First, let me define education. Education is the 
act or process of providing someone with knowledge, skill, or 
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competence. 11 Meaning: No man i pul at ion is used to propagandize 
you into accept i rr·g-·wh.at is being discussed. 
Rules 
The 'Reader' selects an example at random from the 
bank and reads the card aloud, should the contestants request 
a repeat, one re-reading of the example is admissable. As 
soon as any player recognizes (or feel that they know) which 
technique is being represented, they identify the technique 
on :the pad affixed to the 11 techni que card" (using the 
technique identifying number) and immediately grabs the control 
block from the center of the table. If by chance two players 
simultaneously grab the block they have an opportunity to 
enter into a coalition, if no secure coalition can be 
arrived at between them, they may attempt to secure a 
"coalition for majority" with the other player, if no 
coalition can be reached all players regress (-1) one space. 
When only one player has the control block that player is 
then known as the Controller and all other players have 10 
seconds to also arrive at a conclusion and identify it on 
their pads. All players reveal their answers at the 
direction of the 'Reader.' 
If a unanimous majority occurs the Controller advances 3, 
each junior partner advances 1. If a Controller and one-other-
player majority exists and no 'Bold Challenge' is made, the 
Controller advances 3, the other-player (partner) advances 
1, and the odd person out remains stationary. If a majority 
occurs against the Controller and no 'Bold Challenge' is 
made, each majority partner advances 2, the ousted Controller 
regresses -1. In the case of any two player majority, the 
odd person out may attempt to Plea Bargain - by threatening 
the majority with a 'Bold Challenge' - if they will not 
allow him to join their coalition ... if his plea is 
accepted all players advance 1; if rejected the threat of 
'Bold Challenge' is carried to the 'Reader.' (the penalty 
for an incorrect 'Bold Challenge' in the Plea Bargain 
condition is -1, the reward is 1. If both choices are 
in error all players regress -1.) Rewards for a correct 
'Bold Challenge' (not preceeded by a Plea Bargain) are 3 
spaces advance, while the Controller suffers a penalty of 
-2 and h i s p art n e r s uf fer s -1 . If i t i s the Con t ro 11 e r 
who makes the 'Bold Challenge,' he advances (if correct) 
a total of 6, no penalty to the other side. Penalties 
for an incorrect 'Bold Challenge,' for a non-Controller 
suffer -2, for a Controller -3. If a 'Bold Challenge' 
is made and neither side is correct (by decision of the 
'Reader') the challe_t'1_ g~e suffers -1, and the incorrect 
challenger suffers -the standard penalty according to 
condition as stated above. 
After the 'Reader' calls for answer revelation and 
there is no initial majority, any two players may enter into 
a 'coalition for majority' (exactly the same as simultaneous 
grabbing of the control block). In this situation several 
alternative courses of action are available, but in any case 
no points are made if no majority emerges ... and if no 
majority can be made all players suffer -1. Any coalition 
for majority is open to odd-person out Plea Bargaining should 
the odd-person-out decide to attempt it. If a 'coalition 
for majority' is established and no 'Bold Challenge' or 
Plea Bargain is made, the partners in the coalition both 
advance 2. (Please note any changes in prediction brought 
about by a 'coalition for majority' on the score pad of 
the player making the prediction shift.) 
Examples of Play 
A. Player 1, the Controller, identifies the example as #8. 
Players 2 and 3 also identify the example as #8. The 
Controller advances 3 the other partners advance 1 each. 
B. The same situation as above except player 2 chose 
#6; if no 'Bold Challenge' is made the advances are the 
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same as above except that player 2 remains stationary, if however, 
a 'Bold Challenge' is made and it-is incorrect player£ 
suffers -2 ... the 'Bold Challenge' was correct player£ 
advances 3, and the Controller suffers -2 and his partner 
suffers -1. 
C. Player 1, the Controller, identifies the example as #3. 
Players 2 and 3 identify the example as #8. If no 'Bold 
Challenge' is made by the Controller both£ and l advance 2, 
the Controller (even though in the odd-player-out position, 
having been impetuous grabbing the control block, can not be 
challenged as he alone does not constitute a majority) 
however suffers -1 for impetuousity. 
D. Same situation as above except that the Controller chooses 
to make a 'Bold Challenge.' If the 'Bold Challenge' is 
incorrect the Controller suffers -3 and the other players 
advance 2. If the Controller's 'Bold Challenge' is correct 
he scores 3 for the 'Bold Challenge' and 3 for the control 
block for a total point score of 6. -rf instead of a direct 
'Bold Challenge', the Controller chooses to offe~ a Plea 
Bargain and is accepted, all players advance 1, 1f on the 
other hand he is reje~ted he suffers -1 for the Plea Bargain 
consequence of error and -1 for impetuousity for a total 
suffering of -2. If after the Plea Bargain attempt both 
sides were wrong all players suffer -1 (no additional penalty 
of impetuousity is levied on the Controller in this case). 
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If the Controller's 'Bold Challenge• was incorrect for all 
sides and players, a penalty of -2 is suffered by all players. 
E. All players have a different choice for the example, then 
every player has the opportunity to enter into a 'coalition 
for majority.• In these cases if the Controller chooses to 
either accept a partner or is accepted as a partner (determined 
by whomsoever switches from his initial choice to that of his 
partner) then neither the advantages nor the disadvantages 
of being the Controller apply to the scoring, hence the 
option for 'coalition for majority• is not a function of 
Controller asset or deficit. If however, the Controller 
is not in the 'coalition for majority• the same penalties 
and liabilities exist as in any other condition. 
ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
Item No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7 
I • 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Sco~ing Key for Mach V (1968) 
Points -pe-r-Item by Response Patterna 
1. 3. 5. 
A+ 8+ A+ B+ C+ 
C- C- B- A- B-
A+ B+ A+ B+ C+ 
C- C- B- A- 8-
C+ B+ C+ B+ A+ 
A- A- B- C- B-
A+ C+ A+ C+ B+ 
8- 8- C- A- C-
A+ C+ A+ C+ 8+ 
B- B- C- A- C-
A+ 8+ A+ 8+ C+ 
C- C- .B- A- B-
B+ C+ B+ C+ A+ 
A- A- C- B- C-
C+ A+ C+ A+ B+ 
B- B- A- C- A-
C+ A+ C+ A+ B+ 
B- B- A- C- A-
A+ C+ A+ C+ B+ 
B- B- C- A- C-
A+ C+ A+ C+ B+ 
B- B- C- A- C-
C+ A+ C+ A+ B+ 
B- B- A- C- A-
C+ B+ C+ B+ A+ 
A- A- B- C- B-
B+ A+ B+ A+ C+ 
C- C- A- B- A-
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7. 
C+ 
A-
C+ 
A-
A+ 
C-
B+ 
A-
B+ 
A-
C+ 
A-
A+ 
B-
B+ 
C-
B+ 
C-
B+ 
A-
B+ 
A-
B+ 
C-
A+ 
C-
C+ 
B-
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Item No. 1. 3. 5. 7. 
15 C+ A+ C+ A+ B+ B+ 
B- B- A- C- A- C-
16 C+ A+ C+ A+ B+ B+ 
B- B- A- C- A- C-
17. A+ B+ A+ B+ C+ C+ 
C- C- B- A- B- A-
18. C+ B+ C+ B+ A+ A+ 
A- A- B- C- B- C-
19. B+ A+ B+ A+ C+ C+ 
C- C- A- 8- A- B-
20 A+ C+ A+ C+ 8+ B+ 
B- B- C- A- C- A-
aSum for all 20 items and add constant of 20. Range: 40 - 160 
Forced choice Mach V. (Christie and Geis 1970, p. 31-32) 
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In each of the 2 categories please mark over the prefix letter with 
an X if it is most like yourself (compared to the other two choices), 
and mark over the prefix letter with an 0 the item least like your-
self, leave the one remaining prefix letter blank. 
Age 
--
Male Birth rank in family of 
Grade Point Average 
----
Social Security Number ___ _ 
Date of this administration 
Location of administration 
1. A. It takes more imagination to be a successful criminal than 
a successful business man. 
B. The phrase, "the road to hell is paved with good intentions" 
contains a lot of truth. 
C. Mo~t men forget more easily the death of their father than 
the loss of their property. 
2. A. Men are more concerned with the car they drive than with 
the clothes their wives wear. 
B. It is very important that imagination and creativity in 
children be cultivated. 
C. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the 
choice of being put painlessly to death. 
3. A. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless 
it is useful to do so. 
B. The well-being of the individual is the goal that should 
be worked for before anything else. 
C. Since mose people don't know what they want, it is only 
reasonable for ambitious people to talk them into doing 
things. 
4. A. People are getting so lazy and self-indulgent that it is 
bad for our country. 
B. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they 
want to hear. 
C. It would be a good thing if people were kinder to others 
less fortunate than themselves. 
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5. A. Most people are basically good and kind. 
B. The best criteria -for a wife or husband is compatability-
other characteristics are nice but not essential. 
C. Only after a man has gottn what he wants from life should 
he concern himself with the injustices in the world. 
6. A. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral 
lives. 
B. Any man worth his salt shouldn•t be blamed for putting 
his career above his family. 
C. People would be better off if they were concerned less 
with how to do things and more with what to do. 
7. A. A good teacher is one who points out unanswered questions 
rather than gives explicit answers. 
B. When you ask someone to do something, it is best to give 
the real reason for wanting it rather than giving reasons 
which might carry more weight. 
C. A person•s job is the best single guide as to the sort of 
person he is. 
8. ·A. The construction of such monumental works as the Egyptian 
pyramids was worth the enslavement of the workers who built 
them. 
B. Once a way of handling problems has been worked out it is 
best to stick to it. 
C. One should take action only when sure tt is morally right. 
9. A. The world would be a much better place to live in if people 
would let the future take care of itself and concern them-
selves only with enjoying the present. 
B. It is wise to flatter important people. 
C. Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep changing 
it as new circumstances arise. 
10. A. It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the things 
you do because you have no other choice. 
B. The biggest difference between most criminals and other 
people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught. 
C. Even the most hardened and vicious criminal has a spark 
of decency somewhere within him. 
11. A. All in all, it is better to be humble and . honest than to 
be important and dishonest. 
B. A man who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance 
of succeeding in whatever he wants to do. 
C. If a thing does not help us in our daily 11ves, it isn•t 
very important. 
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12. A. A person shouldn't be punished for breaking a law that . 
he · thinks is -- unreasonable. 
B. Too many ciminals are not punished for their crimes. 
C. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 
13. A. Generally speaking, men son't work hard unless they are 
forced to do so. 
B. Every person is entitled to a second chance, even after he 
commits a serious mistake. 
C. People who can't make up their minds are not worth 
bothering about. 
14. A. A man's first responsibility is to his wife, not his 
mother. 
B. Most men are brave. 
C. It's best to pick friends that are intellectually 
stimulating rather than ones it is comfortable to be 
around. 
15. A. There are very few people in the world worth concerning 
oneself about. 
B. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and 
there. 
C. A capable person motivated for his own gain is more useful 
to society than a well-meaning but ineffective one. 
16. A. It is best to give others the impression that you can change 
your mind easily. 
B. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with 
everyone. , 
C. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
17. A. It is possible to be good in all respects. 
B. To help oneself is good; to help others even better. 
C. War and threats of war are unchangeable facts of human life. 
18. A. Barnum was probably right when he said that there's at 
least one sucker born every minute. 
B. Life is pretty dull unless one deliberately stirs up some 
excitement. 
C. Most people would be better off it they control their 
emotions. 
19. A. Sensitivity to the feelings of others is worth more than 
poise in social situations. 
B. The ideal society is one where everybody knows his place 
and accepts it. 
C. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak 
and it will come out when they are given a chance. 
20. A. People who talk about abstract problems usually don't 
know what they-are talking about. 
B. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for 
trouble. 
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C. It is essential for the functioning of a democracy that 
everyone vote. 
APPENDIX B 
For each of the 20 items please mark in the space provided, the 
extent ( VSD_SD_D_N_A_SA_VSA_ as explained below) to 
which you agree with the statement. Very Strongly Disagree (VSD), 
Strongly Disagree (SO), Disagree (D), Neutral (N), Agree (A), 
Strongly Agree (SA), Very strongly Agree (VSA). 
Age 
--
Male Female Birth rank in family of 
Grade Point Average Social Security Number ___ _ 
---
Date of administration 
Location of adminstration 
SCORED: 1. The best way to handle people is to tel l them what they 
+ want to hear. VSD SO 0 N A SA VSA 
2. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best 
to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving 
reasons which might carry more weight. 
+ VSD SO 0 N A SA VSA 
3. Anyone who completely trust anyone else is asking for 
+ trouble. VSD SO 0 N A SA VSA 
4. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here 
+ and there. VSD_SD_D_N_A_SA_VSA 
5. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
VSA SO 0 N A SA VSA 
------
6. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious 
streak and it will come out when they are given a chance. 
+ VSA SO 0 N A SA VSA 
------
7. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something 
+ unless it is useful to do so. VSD_~D_O_N_A_SA_VSA 
8. One should take action only when sure it i s moral ly 
right. vso_so_o_N_A_SA_vsA 
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SCORED: 9. It is wise to flatter important people. 
+ VSO SO 0-- ---N- A SA VSA 
-- --
10. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than 
important and dishonest. VSO_SO_O_N_A_SA_VSA 
11. Barnum was very wrong when he said "There's a sucker 
born every minute." VSO_SO_O_N_A_SA_VSA 
12. People suffering from incurable diseases should have 
the choice of being put painlessly to death. 
+ VSO SO 0 N A SA VSA 
13. It is possible to be good in all respects. 
VSO SO 0 N A SA VSA 
14. Most people are basically good and kind. 
VSO SO 0 N A SA VSA 
15. There is no excuse for lying to someone 
VSO . SO 0 N A SA VSA 
16. Most men forget the death of their father more easily 
than the loss of their property. 
+ VSD SO 0 N A SA VSA 
17. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they 
+ are forced to do so. VSD_SD_D_N_A_SA_VSA 
18. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, 
moral lives. VSD_SO_O_N_A_SA_VSA 
19. The biggest difference between most criminals and 
other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get 
+ caught. VSD_SD_O_N_A_SA_VSA 
20. Most men are brave. VSD SO 0 N A SA VSA 
------
References 
Adams, J. S. Inequity in social change. In L. Berkowitz, 
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychologx (Vol. 2). 
New York: Academic Press, 1965. 
Allen, R., & Green, L., with Moulds, G. H. The propaganda 
game. Burbank: Nova Press, 1965. 
Ami dj aj a, I . R. , & Vi n acke, .w. E. Achievement, nurturance , 
and competition in male and female triads. Journ a 1 of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, £, 447-450. 
Anderson, R. E. Status structures in coalition bargaining 
games. Sociometry, 1967, 30, 393-403. 
Bettinghaus, E. P. Persuasive communicati on. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1968. 
Bogart, K. Machiavellianism and individual differences 1n 
response to cognitive dissonance. Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, New York University, 1968. 
Bond, J. R., & Vinacke, W. E. Coalitions in mixed-sex 
triads. Sociometrx, 1961, 24, 61-75. 
98 
99 
Braginsky, D. Machi~~elJianism and manipulative interpersonal 
behavior in children: two explorative studies. Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1966. In 
R. Christie and F. Geis (Eds.), Studies in Machiavellianism. 
New York: Academic Press, 1970. 
Burgoon, M., Heston, J., & McCroskey, J. Small group 
communication: a functional approach. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, & Winston, 1974. 
Caplow, T. A. A theory of coalitions 1n the triad. American 
Sociological Review, 1956, ~, 489-493. 
Caplow, T. A. Further developments of a theory of coalitions 
in the triad. American Journal of Sociology, 1959, 64, 
488-493. 
Caplow, T. A. Two against one: coalitions in triads. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 
Chertkoff, J. M. The effects of probability of future 
success on coalition formation. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 1966, £, 265-277. 
Chertkoff, J. M. A revision of Caplow's coalition theory. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1967, l, 172-177. 
Chertkoff, J. M. Coalition formation as a function of 
differences in resources. Journal of Conflict Resolution , 
1971, ~' 371-384. 
Christie, R., & Geis, F. Studies in Machiavellianism. New 
York: Academic Press, 1970. 
100 
Durkin, J. E. Emp-athe"tic orientation in physical encounters. 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern 
Psychological Association, Boston, April, 1967. In R. 
Christie and F. Geis (Eds.), Studies in Machiavellianism, 
New York: Academic Press, 1970. 
Exline, R., Gray, D., & Schuette, D. Visual behavior in a 
dyad as affected by interview content and sex of respondent. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 
201-209. 
Gallo, P., .Funk, S., & Levine, J. Reward size, method of 
presentation, and number of alternatives in a Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game. Journal of Persona l ity and Social 
Psychology, 1969, }l, 239-244. 
Gamson, W. A. Experimental studies of coalition formation. 
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Academic Press, 1964. 
Geis F. Machiavellianism and success in a three-person 
game. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1964. 
Geis F. Machiavellianism in a semi-real world. Proceedings 
of the 76th Annual Convention of the American Psychological 
Association, 1968, l, 407-8. 
101 
Geis, F. Machiavel~ian and the manipulation of one's -fellow 
man. Symposium presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, September, 
1964. In R. Christie and F. Geis (Eds.), Studies in 
Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970. 
Geis F., Christie, R., & Nelson, C. In search of the Machiavel. 
In R. Christie and F. Geis (Eds.), Studies in Machiavellianism. 
New York: Academic Press, 1970. 
Geis, F., Levy, M., & Weinheimer, S. The eye of the 
beholder. Mimeograph copy of the paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, 
New York, April, 1966. 
Geis, F., Weinheimer, S., & Berger, D. Playing legislative: 
~ 
Machiavellianism in log-rolling. Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, 
New York, September, 1966. In R. Christie and F. Geis (Eds.), 
Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970. 
Guterman, S. S. The Machiavellians. University of Nebraska 
Press: Lincoln, 1970. 
Harris T. Machiavellianism, judgment, independence and 
attitudes toward teammate in a cooperative judgment task. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1966. 
Harsanyi, J. C. A simplified bargaining model for then-
person cooperative games. International Economic Review, 
1963, i' 194-220. 
Jones, E., Gergen, K.~_ A Davis, K. Some determinants of 
reactions to being approved or disapproved as a person. 
Psychological Monographs, 1962, I, 76. 
Kelly, H. H.,~ Arrowood, A. J. Coalitions in the 
triad: critique and experiment. Sociometry, 1960, 
~' 231-244. 
Komorita, S. S., & Chertkoff, J. A bargaining theory of 
coalition formation. Psychological Review, 1973, 80, 
149-162. 
102 
Lawler, E. J. The impact of status differences on coalitional 
agreements. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1957a, 
~(2), 271-279. 
Lawler, E. J. An experimantal study of factors affecting the 
mobilization of revolutionary coalitions. Sociometry, 
1975, 38, 163-179. 
Michener, H. A., & Lyons, M. Perceived support and upward 
mobility as determinants of revolutionary coalitional 
behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
1972, ~' 180-195. 
Nash, J. F. The bargaining problem. 
~' 128-140. 
Econometrics, 1950, 
Newcomb, T. M. 
attitudes: 
Persistence and regression of changed 
long-range studies. Journal of Social Issues, 
1963, ~' 3-14. 
Noviell, J. Who per~uades whom. Unpublished master's 
thesis, University of Delaware, 1968. In R. Christie 
and F. Geis (Eds.), Studies in Machiavellianism. 
New York: Academic, 1970. 
103 
Ofshe, R., & Ofshe, L. Social choice and utility in coalition 
formation. Sociometry, 1969, l£, 330-347. 
Ofshe, R., & Ofshe, L. Choice behavior in coalition games. 
Behavioral Science, 1970, ~' 337-349. 
Ofshe, R., & Ofshe, L. Utility and choice in social interaction. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 
Rapoport, A. Fights, games and debates. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1960. 
Rim, Y. Machiavellianism and decisions involving risks. 
British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 1966, 
~' 50-56. 
Shapely, L. S. A value theory for n-person games. In 
H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the 
theory of games (Vol. 2). Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1953. 
Singer, J. The use of manipulative strategies: Machiavellianism 
and attractiveness. Sociometry, 1964, £L, 128-150. 
Tedeschi, J., Schienker, B., & Sonoma, T. Conflict, power, 
and games: the experimental study of interpersonal relations. 
Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1973. 
104 
Vesugl, T. T., & Vin~ck~~ W. E. Strategy in a feminine game. 
Sociometry, 1963, ~' 75-88. 
Vinacke, W. E. Sex roles in a three person game. Sociometry, 
1959, ~' 343-360. 
Vinacke, W. E. Power, strategy and the formation of coalitions 
under four incentive conditions. Technical Report #1, 
University of Hawaii, 1962. In J. Tedeschi, B. Schlenker, 
& T. Sonoma (Eds.), Conflict, power and games: the experi-
mental study of interpersonal relations. Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing, 1973. 
Vinacke, W. E. Variables in experimental games: toward a 
field theory. Psychological Bulletin, 1969 , Zl, 293-318. 
Vinacke, W. E., & Arkoff, A. An experimental study of 
/ 
coalitions in the triad. American Sociological Review, 
1957, 22, 406-414. 
Vinacke, W. E.; Crowell, D. C.; Dien, D.; & Young, V. The 
effect of information about strategy on a three-person 
game. Behavioral Science, 1966, 11, 180-189. 
Von Meumann, J., & Morganstern, 0. Theory of games and 
economic behavior. New York: Wiley, 1944. 
Walton, R., & McKersie, R. A behavioral theory of labor 
negotiations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 
Weinstein, E., Beckhouse, L., Blumstein, P., & Stein, R. 
Interpersonal strategies under conditions of gain or 
loss. Journal of Personality, 1968, ~' 616-634. 
Wrightsman, L. S. Jr~ , _&Cook, S. W. Factor analysis and 
attitude change. Peabody-Papers in Human Development, 
1965, l(2) 
Zinnes, D. A. Coalition theories and the balance of power. 
InS. Groennings, E. W. Kelly, & M. Leiserson (Eds.), 
105 
The study of coalition behavior: theoretical perspectives 
and cases from four continents. New York: Holt, Rinehart 
& Winston, 1970. 
